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JACK L. LANDAU∗ 
The Search for the Meaning of 
Oregon’s Search and Seizure Clause 
n celebrating the sesquicentennial of the Oregon Constitution, it is 
fitting to take a few moments to consider what is one of the most 
significant provisions in the entire document: article I, section 9, 
which provides that 
[n]o law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or 
seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.1 
Certainly, in terms of the number of judicial opinions, the search and 
seizure provision of the Oregon Constitution has received the most 
attention.  More than 800 Oregon appellate court opinions have been 
authored concerning the meaning and application of article I, section 
9—more than any other single provision of the state constitution.  
Moreover, article I, section 9 served as one of the principal 
battlefields of the state constitutional revolution for which Oregon is 
justly famous.2  The story of the provision’s interpretation, in fact, is a 
microcosm of the interpretation of the Oregon Constitution generally.  
In that regard, it is a story marked by halting acceptance of state 
constitutionalism, followed by occasional bold departures from 
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1 OR. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
2 See, e.g., David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report 
from the Provinces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 275, 275 (1989) (“[A] report from 
Oregon is not from some provincial and primitive venue, but—with respect to state 
constitutional law—from the capital of the future itself.”). 
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federal doctrines while accompanied by continued adherence to other 
federal doctrines with no explanation of the decision to do so. 
In this Article, I trace the history of the interpretation of article I, 
section 9.  That history provides a useful lens through which to 
examine larger questions about the nature of the Oregon appellate 
courts’ commitment to state constitutionalism and the techniques with 
which they determine the meaning of the Oregon Constitution. 
One problem with tracing that history is that, precisely because the 
search and seizure jurisprudence of this state covers so much territory, 
I need to sharpen the focus more narrowly than merely describing the 
course of judicial interpretation of article I, section 9 generally.3  So, I 
limit my account of the history of the provision’s judicial 
interpretation to the development of a single doctrinal point, namely, 
the foundational question whether the state constitution creates the 
same sort of preference for warrants that has come to be recognized as 
the basis for search and seizure analysis under the Fourth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution. 
My account proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, I discuss the origins 
of article I, section 9, including the origins of its Fourth Amendment 
precursor and some of the historiographical debates about the 
intended meaning of state and federal search and seizure guarantees.  
I explain that there are widely divergent views about the origins of 
state and federal search and seizure guarantees.  Some scholars 
suggest that the framers of the state and federal guarantees would 
have understood those guarantees to require, at least implicitly, a 
preference for warrants.  Others suggest that such a notion turns the 
historical record “on its head” and that early search and seizure 
guarantees were intended to impose only a broad reasonableness 
requirement.  Still others suggest that the historical record reveals that 
the framers would have understood early search and seizure 
guarantees to impose a requirement of particularity on the issuance of 
warrants, but otherwise to impose no requirements on warrantless 
police conduct. 
In Part II, I turn to the judicial construction of article I, section 9, 
tracing in particular the development of the warrant-preference rule.  
The story of that construction turns out to be—to borrow a phrase—a 
rather long and winding road.  There is, as it turns out, no overarching 
 
3 For a more complete description of Oregon search and seizure law, see generally 
PAUL J. DE MUNIZ, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OREGON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE & 
PRACTICE (3d ed. 2008). 
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story line; rather, the doctrine has developed by fits and starts, with no 
real analysis and a surprising tendency to rely on federal search and 
seizure law. 
In Part III, I offer some personal observations about the 
development of Oregon search and seizure law and suggest that the 
doctrine’s current condition is puzzling.  The Oregon courts profess a 
commitment to state constitutionalism, that is, the significance of 
state constitutional doctrine apart from, and independent of, federal 
constitutional doctrine.  In particular, the Oregon Supreme Court 
professes a commitment to a jurisprudence of original intent in giving 
the Oregon Constitution its separate and independent significance.  
Yet, at the same time, the court largely adheres to federal 
constitutional search and seizure doctrine when it interprets article I, 
section 9, at least with respect to the warrant-preference rule.  Why 
the court has failed to apply its usual originalist approach to the 
warrant-preference issue is a mystery.  Moreover, that the court has 
chosen simply to parrot the federal warrant-preference rule without 
further analysis or explanation is, I submit, odd for a state in which 
the state constitutional revolution was virtually born. 
I suggest that these anomalies have practical rather than merely 
theoretical significance.  How the court sorts through the historical 
debate concerning the intended meaning of state and federal search 
and seizure guarantees could make a difference; the result could be 
continued adherence to a warrant-preference rule, abandonment of the 
rule in favor of a broader rule of reasonableness, or adoption of the 
conclusion that the guarantees do not constrain warrantless police 
conduct at all.  Moreover, federal search and seizure doctrine is not 
static.  The U.S. Supreme Court has shown little hesitation to overturn 
well-settled doctrines to more closely hew to the intentions of the 
framers of the Federal Constitution.  If the Court were to do so with 
respect to the Fourth Amendment warrant-preference rule, it would 
leave the Oregon courts in something of a pickle. 
In the end, I suggest that the answer is to treat article I, section 9 as 
the free-standing, state constitutional guarantee that it is.  I suggest 
that—whether because originalism is an untenable interpretive 
method or because of the provision’s peculiar wording—resolving the 
historiographical debate about the provision’s origins is not 
necessary.  The courts can and should determine whether article I, 
section 9—independently of Federal Fourth Amendment doctrine—
presumptively requires warrants for searches and seizures to be 
reasonable. 
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I 
THE ORIGINS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 
Oregon’s search and seizure guarantee, like any constitutional 
provision, was not adopted in a vacuum.  It has a history, which 
begins with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment after which the 
guarantee was patterned.  Much of the Fourth Amendment’s history is 
well known and unremarkable.  That said, there is much that remains 
the subject of considerable debate among historians and legal 
scholars—debate that has largely escaped the attention of the Oregon 
appellate courts.  Because that debate has potential significance for 
the interpretation of article I, section 9, I briefly describe not only the 
events leading up to the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, but also, in 
broad outline, the historiographical dispute about the significance of 
those events.  I then focus more particularly on what we know about 
the origins of article I, section 9. 
A.  The Adoption of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.4 
It is generally accepted that, although the amendment’s wording can 
be traced to revolutionary era state constitutions, the source for both 
was a concern about the misuse of general warrants in England and 
the colonies during the mid-eighteenth century.5  “General warrants” 
referred to writs that authorized the bearer to search unspecified 
places or arrest persons suspected of having been involved with a 
 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 
YALE L.J. 393, 396 (1995) (“[L]ike other items in the Bill of Rights, the Fourth 
Amendment echoed several state constitutional provisions.  But its real source, historians 
seem to agree, was the same as the source of those state provisions: a trio of famous cases 
from the 1760s, two in England and one in the colonies.” (footnote omitted)).  But see 
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1707, 1707–08, 1715–16 (1996) (book review) (criticizing “lawyers’ histories” of the 
Fourth Amendment as incomplete and tending to focus only on incidents in the decade 
before the American Revolution).  For a useful summary of the history of the Fourth 
Amendment, see generally THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS 
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 23–43 (2008). 
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criminal offense.6  Three well-known instances of abusive use of 
general warrants are commonly cited as the sources for state and 
federal constitutional search and seizure guarantees. 
The first of the three is known as the Writs of Assistance Case.7  A 
“writ of assistance” was a form of general warrant used to authorize 
customs officials to search houses and other buildings.8  In 1761, a 
group of sixty-three Boston merchants challenged the lawfulness of 
the writ.  Arguing on behalf of the merchants, James Otis, Jr.—who 
was, according to John Adams, “by far the most able, manly and 
commanding Character of his Age at the Bar”9—asserted that the writ 
of assistance “is against the fundamental Principles of Law. . . . A 
Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his 
Castle—notwithstanding all his Debts, & civil processes of any 
Kind.”10  In particular, Otis argued, the writ conferred unlimited 
discretion on customs officials who executed them.11  As such, he 
contended, the writ and the statute that authorized it would be, in the 
words of Lord Coke’s famous Dr. Bonham’s Case, “against common 
right and reason” and therefore void.12  The argument was not 
 
6 “General warrants command either apprehension for unstated causes or the arrest, 
search, or seizure of unspecified persons, places, or objects.”  William J. Cuddihy, General 
Warrants, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1185–86 (2d ed. 
Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2000).  Until the late-eighteenth century, they 
had been used commonly in England to combat vagrancy, regulate publications, pursue 
felons, collect taxes, and reclaim stolen goods.  Id. 
7 There is no official case report.  Although the case is sometimes referred to by the 
names of the customs officials involved (in particular, Charles Paxton, the Surveyor and 
Searcher of the Port of Boston and one of the most unpopular government officials of the 
era), see, e.g., William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: 
Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1034 (1994) (referring to Paxton’s Case), it is most often simply 
referred to as the Writs of Assistance Case.  Probably the most detailed account may be 
found in M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978). 
8 SMITH, supra note 7, at 39.  The name originates with the function of the writ, namely, 
to obtain assistance in carrying out the customs officials’ duties.  Id. at 38–39.  Although 
the writs did not actually provide search authority, they have long been considered a type 
of general warrant.  Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood 
Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 11 
(2007). 
9 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 275 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961). 
10 John Adams’s Contemporaneous Notes of the Writs of Assistance Hearing in 
February 1761, reprinted in SMITH, supra note 7, app. I, at 543, 544. 
11 Id. 
12 The careful cite-checker will not find a reference to Bonham’s Case in Adams’s 
notes.  The notes are: 
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successful.  The colonial court upheld the validity of the writ, 
although popular opposition did not relent.13 
The second of the trio of general warrant abuses is a collection of 
lawsuits that arose in England shortly after the Writs of Assistance 
Case involving John Wilkes and other like-minded opponents of the 
Tory government.14  Secretary of State Lord Halifax issued general 
warrants authorizing government officers—somewhat ominously 
known as “messengers”—to arrest any person who was involved in 
the publication of seditious libel.  The warrants did not identify any 
particular persons to be arrested or places to be searched.  Under the 
authority of those general warrants, the messengers arrested Wilkes 
and his friends, searched their homes, and seized their papers.  Wilkes 
and his friends, however, did not take the affront to what they thought 
were their rights lying down; they brought trespass actions in the 
Court of Common Pleas against the messengers and won.  In several 
cases concluded between 1763 and 1769, the court instructed the 
juries that searches and seizures conducted pursuant to general 
warrants violated common-law rights, and, following those 
instructions, the juries awarded damages to Wilkes and his friends.15  
The following year, Parliament passed resolutions condemning the 
 
 As to Acts of Parliament. an Act against the Constitution is void: an Act 
against natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament should be made, in the 
very Words of this Petition, it would be void.  The Executive Courts must pass 
such Acts into disuse—8. Rep. 118. from Viner.—Reason of the Com Law to 
control an Act of Parliament. 
Id.  The reference to “8. Rep. 118. from Viner.” is generally taken to refer to Charles 
Viner’s commentary on Lord Coke’s own commentary on the case, reported at 8 Coke’s 
Rep. 107, 118 (1609).  See also NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 58–59 (1937) 
(discussing Otis’s reference to Bonham’s Case); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the 
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 690 nn.407–08 (1999) (explaining 
the connection to Bonham’s Case). 
13 The Massachusetts colonial legislature even passed a bill outlawing general warrants, 
but the bill was vetoed by the governor.  JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 35 (1966). 
14 For summaries of these events, see generally id. at 28–30 and LASSON, supra note 
12, at 43–50. 
15 The cases most commonly cited are: Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763); 
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Leach v. Money, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 
(1765); and Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).  The Entick case, in particular, later 
proved to be a popular citation by nineteenth- and twentieth-century jurists for the trial 
court’s instructions to the jury, although it has been pointed out that there is some question 
whether the reported version of those instructions was known in the colonies until well 
after the revolution.  See Davies, supra note 12, at 565 n.25 (noting that the version of the 
trial court’s statements most often later quoted was not published until 1781). 
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use of general warrants, at least without prior parliamentary 
approval.16  Meanwhile, Wilkes took on Lord Halifax himself, 
eventually winning a judgment of four thousand pounds for the 
Secretary’s use of “nameless” warrants.17  The cases—usually 
referred to collectively as the “Wilkesite” or just “Wilkes cases”—
were to be very influential in the development of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.18 
The third of the abuses of general warrants arose with the 
enactment of the Townsend Duties Act of 1767.  Recall that, 
following the judgments in the Wilkesite cases, Parliament 
condemned the use of general warrants without prior legislative 
authorization.  In 1767, Parliament gave such approval when it 
enacted the Townsend Duties Act,19 which authorized the use of 
general writs of assistance for customs searches in the American 
colonies.  The enactment created a considerable stir in the colonies 
over the legality of general warrants, at least outside of Massachusetts 
(where the matter had already been decided).20  Some colonial courts 
declared that the general writs of assistance were “unconstitutional”; 
others simply did not act on requests to issue them.21 
 
16 The Parliamentary debates on the use of general warrants prompted William Pitt’s 
now-famous speech that: 
[t]he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.  
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may 
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force 
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
Quoted in THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 611 
n.1 (8th ed. 1927). 
17 There is no case report for Wilkes v. Halifax, although practically every account of 
the Wilkesite cases includes a reference to the verdict.  See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 
13, at 28; LASSON, supra note 12, at 45; Davies, supra note 12, at 630–31 n.222.  The 
usual reference, Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 How. St. Tr. 1406 (C.P. 1769), refers to an 
addendum to reports of the Wilkesite cases, which includes a short summary of the judge’s 
instructions in that case. 
18 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 12, at 562–65 (referring to “Wilkesite” cases); Tracey 
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 
925, 933–34 (1997) (referring to “Wilkes cases”). 
19 7 Geo. III, ch. 46, § 10 (Eng. 1767). 
20 As Leonard Levy explains, the Townsend Duties Act “expanded the controversy over 
writs of assistance to all of the thirteen colonies.  What had been a local controversy, 
centering mainly on Boston, spread continent-wide.”  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 233 (1988).  Even in Massachusetts, as 
Lasson recounts, the enforcement of writs of assistance under authority of the Townsend 
Acts caused riots.  LASSON, supra note 12, at 72. 
21 Id. at 73–76. 
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Colonial concerns about the abuse of general warrants were among 
the most prominent in the lengthening list of grievances against the 
King and Parliament that led to the American Revolution.22  Not 
surprisingly, when the newly independent colonies adopted their own 
constitutions—as did twelve of the original states—most included in 
those constitutions declarations of individual rights, including 
provisions concerning search and seizure specifically condemning the 
use of general warrants.23 
Virginia’s first constitution, for example, provided that: 
general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact 
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose 
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are 
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.24 
The Virginia provision served as a model for other states, in particular 
Maryland and North Carolina.25  Pennsylvania used as its model an 
earlier draft of the Virginia Constitution, with the addition of a 
preamble declaring “[t]hat the people have a right to hold themselves, 
their houses, papers, and possessions free from search or seizure,” 
followed by the declaration that, “therefore, warrants without oaths or 
affirmations first made . . . are contrary to that right and ought not to 
be granted.”26  Vermont, in turn, used the Pennsylvania Constitution 
as its model, including the preamble.27  John Adams’s draft of the 
 
22 The subject of unreasonable searches and seizures, however, is not on the list of 
grievances that comprise the Declaration of Independence, an omission that a number of 
scholars have remarked is surprising.  See, e.g., id. at 80. 
23 For general accounts of the adoption of early state constitutions and, in particular, 
early state declarations of rights, see generally WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (expanded ed. 2001); MARC W. KRUMAN, 
STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 125–257 (1969).  
Unfortunately, those accounts focus on larger issues of political ideology and government 
structure and spend scant attention, if any, to the particulars of early search and seizure 
guarantees.  The best summary of the early development of state search and seizure 
guarantees that I have seen to date is Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure 
History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original 
Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 89–127 (2007); see also LEVY, 
supra note 20, at 236–40. 
24 VA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 10. 
25 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, 
Declaration of Rights, art. XI. 
26 PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. X. 
27 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, § XI. 
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Massachusetts Constitution followed suit, incorporating the 
Pennsylvania preamble with some slight alterations of his own.  For 
the first time among state constitutions, Adams inserted the word 
“unreasonable” into the search and seizure vocabulary: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all 
his possessions.  All warrants, therefore, are contrary to his right, if 
the cause or the foundation of them be not previously supported by 
oath or affirmation; . . . with a special designation of the persons or 
objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be 
issued, but in cases and with the formalities prescribed by the 
laws.28 
When James Madison took on the task of drafting the first set of 
proposed amendments to the newly adopted Federal Constitution, he 
did not write on a blank slate; he worked from the many bills of rights 
that already had been adopted in state constitutions.  That certainly 
was the case in drafting what would become the Fourth Amendment, 
which was largely based on the Massachusetts prohibition against 
general warrants.29  Interestingly, Madison’s first draft introduced 
some significant innovations, including merging the two separate 
statements of the Massachusetts provision into a single sentence, 
phrasing the declaration in terms of rights held by “the people,” and 
inserting a standard of “probable cause” for the issuance of warrants: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, 
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not 
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or 
things to be seized.30 
The committee that reviewed Madison’s draft made further changes.  
Significantly, although it retained the single-clause format that 
Madison had proposed, it rephrased the connection between the 
preamble setting out the rights of the people and the prohibition 
against general warrants.  Where Madison’s draft said that the rights 
of the people “shall not be violated by warrants issued without 
probable cause,” the committee draft proposed instead—and 
 
28 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. I, § 14. 
29 For summaries of the Fourth Amendment’s drafting history, see generally LEVY, 
supra note 20, at 240–45; LASSON, supra note 12, at 97–105; LANDYNSKI, supra note 13, 
at 40–44; Davies, supra note 23, at 127–72. 
30 EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 206 
(1979). 
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somewhat more ambiguously, as we will see—that the rights of the 
people “shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue” except 
upon probable cause.31 
B.  The Debate About the Intended Scope of the Fourth Amendment 
The events that I have described, including the various borrowings 
from one draft constitution to another, are well known and not much 
debated.  What is the subject of a heated debate—particularly in the 
last decade—is the significance of those events in reconstructing the 
intended scope and meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  That debate 
tends to focus on the relationship between what are generally 
recognized as the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment—the 
“reasonableness clause,” which states that the people have a right to 
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures; and the “warrants 
clause,” which provides that warrants may not issue except upon 
probable cause. 
Three schools of thought have emerged concerning the intended 
relationship between those two clauses.  One such school—clearly the 
orthodox view—asserts that the two clauses were intended by the 
framers to function independently, the first guaranteeing a 
comprehensive right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and, concomitantly, requiring that any searches and seizures 
be reasonable; and the second, requiring that warrants not issue 
except upon probable cause.  According to this view, the requirement 
that searches and seizures not be unreasonable imposes a legal 
obligation separate and apart from the requirement that warrants not 
issue except upon probable cause.  That reasonableness requirement 
consists of a presumption that, to be reasonable, a search or seizure 
must be supported by the issuance of a judicially approved warrant.  
This is commonly known as the “warrant-preference” rule or doctrine. 
The historical support for the conventional view was first 
marshaled by Nelson B. Lasson in The History and Development of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.32  Several 
decades later, the view was again asserted by Jacob W. Landynski in 
his Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in 
Constitutional Interpretation.33  It must be said that, in both cases, the 
actual historical evidence on which both authors relied was fairly 
 
31 Id. at 213–14. 
32 See LASSON, supra note 12. 
33 See LANDYNSKI, supra note 13. 
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skimpy.34  Lasson, for example, concluded that the reasonableness 
clause of the Fourth Amendment obviously was intended to be “given 
a broader scope” than a mere preface, based on the change in wording 
from Madison’s original single-clause format to what he (somewhat 
circularly) characterized as a two-clause format.35  In a similar vein, 
Landynski traced the conventional history of the amendment, 
including last-minute textual alterations—which Landynski said no 
one apparently noticed at the time—and then concluded that, “[f]rom 
the foregoing historical account, the relationship of the two clauses 
seems clear enough.”36  He then proceeded to reason, not from the 
historical evidence but from the juxtaposition of the two clauses, that 
the reasonableness clause “was evidently meant to re-emphasize (and, 
in some undefined way, strengthen) the requirements for a valid 
warrant set forth in the second clause.  The second clause, in turn, 
defines and interprets the first, telling us the kind of search that is not 
unreasonable . . . .” 37 
In contrast, independent scholar William J. Cuddihy produced a 
much more thorough examination of the historical evidence in 1990.  
His massive, three-volume Ph.D. dissertation on the origins of the 
Fourth Amendment has been circulating in unpublished form for 
some years and is now regularly cited by supporters of the 
conventional, warrant-preference view.38 
 
34 See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 5, at 1708 (Lasson’s account, although “the pre-eminent 
history of the Fourth Amendment for more than half a century,” like other “lawyers’ 
histories,” is “incomplete in the scope and depth” of his research). 
35 LASSON, supra note 12, at 103.  The entirety of the discussion, in fact, consists of the 
following: 
As reported by the Committee of Eleven and corrected by [Elbridge] Gerry, the 
Amendment was a one-barrelled affair, directed apparently only to the essentials 
of a valid warrant.  The general principle of freedom from unreasonable search 
and seizure seems to have been stated only by way of premise, and the positive 
inhibition upon action by the Federal Government limited consequently to the 
issuance of warrants without probable cause, etc.  That [Egbert] Benson 
interpreted it in this light is shown by his argument that although the clause was 
good as far as it went, it was not sufficient, and by the change which he 
advocated to obviate this objection.  The provision as he proposed it contained 
two clauses.  The general right of security from unreasonable search and seizure 
was given a sanction of its own and the amendment thus intentionally given a 
broader scope. 
Id. 
36 LANDYNSKI, supra note 14, at 41–43. 
37 Id. at 43. 
38 An edited and revised version of the thesis was finally published in January 2009.  
WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
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A second school of thought concurs with the conventional view 
that the Fourth Amendment consists of two separately enforceable 
clauses.  But this school takes issue with the conventional view that 
the reasonableness clause can be read to imply a preference for 
warrants.  This alternative view first emerged in the 1960s with the 
publication of Telford Taylor’s Two Studies in Constitutional 
Interpretation: Search, Seizure, and Surveillance and Fair Trial and 
Free Press.39  According to Taylor, the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment feared warrants and did not prefer them, and the 
conventional warrant-preference doctrine “stood the fourth 
amendment on its head.”40  More recently, Akhil Amar has proposed 
 
602–1791 (2009).  Cuddihy’s thesis was extensively summarized in Maclin, supra note 18, 
at 929 (comparing Cuddihy’s research with research of proponents of competing views of 
the Fourth Amendment, in particular Akhil Amar), and in Cloud, supra note 5, at 1712–
1720.  Cuddihy’s principal contention is that the Fourth Amendment was intended by its 
framers to mandate the use of specific warrants as the conventional method of search and 
seizure and that the amendment was not intended to be limited to the subject of general 
warrants.  “Many kinds of searches and seizures were unreasonable within the original 
meaning of the amendment,” he asserts, “not just general warrants.”  Cuddihy, The Fourth 
Amendment, supra, at civ.  In particular, Cuddihy emphasizes the fact that, although the 
framers may have focused on the problem of general warrants in the revolutionary era, in 
the 1780s, attention turned to the use of specific warrants as the preferred mechanism for 
accomplishing searches and seizures.  This preference was evidenced by the adoption of 
specific warrant statutes by a number of states in the years immediately preceding the 
ratification of the Constitution.  Id. at 882–83, 1338–40. 
 Not surprisingly, Cuddihy’s thesis has been embraced by proponents of the warrant-
preference view.  See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 18; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 154–56 (1999) (Levy was Cuddihy’s dissertation advisor.).  Cuddihy’s 
work also has been cited in U.S. Supreme Court opinions.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
for example, described the dissertation as “one of the most exhaustive analyses of the 
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment ever undertaken.”  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Although universally hailed 
for its thoroughness, Cuddihy’s thesis still has not proved to be the last word on Fourth 
Amendment history.  In fact, the very thoroughness of his research has revealed that the 
amendment’s history may be much more complex and subtle than the conventional 
accounts have suggested.  As Morgan Cloud observed in his review of the thesis, “for all 
its richness of detail, or perhaps because of it, the work is difficult to use.”  Cloud, supra 
note 5, at 1720.  Cuddihy, for example, demonstrates that much of the historical record is 
ambiguous and even inconsistent, leaving much room for further interpretation and debate.  
Id. at 1717 (“Inconsistent rules were applied inconsistently in differing circumstances.  
This was as true in the century preceding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment as it was 
in earlier centuries.”). 
39 TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, 
SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1969). 
40 Id. at 23–24.  According to Taylor, 
[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but 
about overreaching warrants.  It is perhaps too much to say that they feared the 
warrant more than the search, but it is plain enough that the warrant was the 
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that, although Taylor was correct that the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment viewed warrants with suspicion—and, hence, certainly 
intended no preference for warrants—Taylor missed the larger point 
that they intended a generalized reasonableness requirement to 
provide a “global” standard by which all searches are to be 
evaluated.41 
In support of this view, Amar first notes that the Fourth 
Amendment itself simply does not say what the proponents of the 
conventional warrant-preference view contend, namely, that warrants 
are presumed to be necessary for searches and seizures to be 
reasonable.42  To the contrary, the amendment says only that searches 
and seizures must not be unreasonable.  Moreover, he observes, the 
historical record shows that not a single reported decision, state or 
federal, read the Fourth Amendment or its state constitutional 
counterparts to require warrants until nearly 100 years after the 
amendment’s adoption.43  To the contrary, he notes, state court 
decisions interpreting state constitutional search and seizure 
provisions based on the Fourth Amendment held that the 
reasonableness clauses of state search and seizure guarantees did not 
require warrants.44 
More recently, there has emerged a third school of thought about 
the relationship between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment.  
 
prime object of their concern.  Far from looking at the warrant as a protection 
against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable and 
oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in line with 
the stringent requirements applicable to common-law warrants for stolen     
goods . . . . 
Id. at 41.  Taylor relied on, among other things, the wording of early state constitutional 
search and seizure guarantees, which specifically condemned general warrants issued 
without probable cause and did not address at all the issue of warrantless searches or 
seizures.  Id. at 41–43.  According to Taylor, the framers “took for granted” that arrested 
persons would be searched without a warrant, as such had been the law for centuries and 
remained so until the late-nineteenth century.  Id. at 27–29, 43. 
41 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762–
64 (1994). 
42 As Amar sees it, 
 The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean what they say.  They do 
not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and seizures.  They do not 
require probable cause for all searches and seizures without warrants.  They do 
not require—or even invite—exclusions of evidence, contraband, or stolen 
goods. 
Id. at 761. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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Led by Thomas Davies, this school holds that there is a remarkable 
absence of historical evidence to support either the warrant-preference 
view or the comprehensive reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment.45  According to Davies, the reasonableness clause was 
never intended to function as anything other than a preamble to the 
amendment’s only operative provision, namely, a limitation on the 
issuance of general warrants.46  In Davies’s view, the Fourth 
Amendment was never understood nor intended by its framers to 
operate as a limitation on warrantless searches and seizures at all.  
Such matters, he contends, were to be governed by common-law 
restrictions on warrantless arrest, which were understood by the 
framers to be constitutionally embraced by the guarantee that no 
person’s life, liberty, or property may be taken except by “due process 
of law.”47  Search and seizure doctrine became hopelessly 
disconnected from its historical moorings, he contends, when 
nineteenth-century courts essentially hijacked the Due Process Clause 
for other purposes and were left to shoehorn an ahistorical warrant-
preference doctrine into the Fourth Amendment to address abusive 
 
45 See generally Davies, supra note 12, at 551; Davies, supra note 23, at 34.  In the first 
of the two articles, Davies sets out his account of “authentic” Fourth Amendment history, 
emphasizing the fact that the framers were concerned with “too-loose warrants” and not 
warrantless searches.  Davies, supra note 12, at 552.  In the latter article, he turns his 
attention to his corollary contention, that is, that the subject of warrantless law 
enforcement conduct was understood by the framers of the Fourth Amendment to have 
been the subject of the Due Process Clause.  Davies, supra note 23, at 7.  He also describes 
the development of revolutionary era state constitutional search and seizure and due 
process guarantees, which he contends confirms his characterization of the views of the 
Fourth Amendment framers.  Id. at 8. 
46 According to Davies, in drafting the Fourth Amendment, Madison borrowed from 
existing state constitutional search and seizure provisions, like the Massachusetts 
provision, drafted in explicit, “two-clause” format—that is, an initial general statement of 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, followed by a warrant clause 
stating that, “therefore,” warrants must not be issued except on oath or affirmation setting 
out the bases for its issuance.  Davies, supra note 12, at 696–97.  Madison, Davies 
suggests, altered the format only slightly, removing the reference to “therefore” and stating 
the entire amendment in a single clause, for what were “likely stylistic” reasons.  Id. at 
697. 
47 Davies suggests that: 
[T]he state declarations of rights and the Federal Bill of Rights set out 
constitutional limits on what we now call “search-and-seizure” authority in two 
provisions rather than one.  The general search-and-seizure provision, which 
regulated warrantless arrests as well as other requisites for initiating criminal 
prosecutions, was stated in the traditional invocative language of “the law of the 
land” or “due process of law,” while the ban against general warrants was stated 
separately, explicitly, and in detail. 
Davies, supra note 23, at 11. 
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law enforcement practices that emerged with post-Civil War 
developments in criminal investigatory procedures.48  A warrant-
preference doctrine may be justified on many grounds, he contends, 
but history is not among them.49 
In support of his theses, Davies traced the development of state and 
federal constitutional due process (or, in some cases, “law of the 
land”) and search and seizure clauses, including interpretation of 
those provisions by early nineteenth-century courts and 
contemporaneous legal treatises.50  According to Davies, that research 
conclusively demonstrates that the conventional warrant-preference 
view is “only the product of relatively recent, ideologically-driven 
judicial choices, not a rendition of the original understanding” of the 
Fourth Amendment.51 
Interestingly, one scholar, David E. Steinberg, believes that Davies 
has not gone far enough.52  According to Steinberg, the history 
surrounding the adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights shows that the 
framers intended the Fourth Amendment to be limited not only to 
correcting the abusive use of general warrants but also to the use of 
such warrants to search houses, as opposed to ships and other 
structures.53  “Outside of house searches,” Steinberg asserts, “the 
Fourth Amendment was simply inapplicable.”54 
In the wake of these proposals, a not-surprisingly vigorous debate 
has ensued, with each side suggesting that another has incompletely 
or inaccurately interpreted the historical evidence.55  Who is right?  I 
 
48 Id. at 172–95. 
49 Id. at 223. 
50 Id. at 87–127. 
51 Id. at 224.  It should be noted that, although Davies is a critic of the historical basis 
for current Fourth Amendment doctrine, he is no originalist.  To the contrary, Davies 
contends that even “authentic history” of the Fourth Amendment “cannot provide us with a 
basis for deciding the specific search-and-seizure issues that arise today” because of the 
great gulf that separates framing era doctrinal conceptions and criminal justice institutions 
from those of our own era.  Id. at 222–23. 
52 David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 581 (2008). 
53 Id. at 581–82. 
54 Id. at 583. 
55 The articles on Fourth Amendment history seem to be multiplying like rabbits, 
particularly recently.  For years, Lasson’s and Landynksi’s conventional accounts of the 
origins of the Fourth Amendment were unquestioned.  That changed in 1969 with the 
publication of Taylor’s revisionist view of Fourth Amendment history.  His criticism of 
the conventional view itself generated some criticism, but not much.  Everything changed, 
however, in the early 1990s.  No doubt, much of that can be traced to Amar’s deliberately 
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do not know.  And it would take a very, very long article even to 
attempt to sort out the matter. 
I will venture to state, however, that I find Davies’s thesis 
intriguing in that it seems most consistent with early nineteenth-
century case law and with contemporaneous treatises.  As he points 
out, early cases do suggest that courts understood that state search and 
seizure counterparts to the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to 
warrantless searches and arrests.56  Indeed, even critics of the general 
warrants school concede that “it is well-known that states showed a 
marked interest in minimizing search and seizure protections” in the 
nineteenth century.57 
The 1850 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in 
Rohan v. Sawin58 provides a good example.  In that case, the plaintiff 
brought an action for assault and false imprisonment arising out of an 
incident in which a constable arrested him and took him to jail on 
suspicion of having committed theft.  The constable, without a 
 
provocative 1994 essay, which, since then, has spawned something of a cottage industry of 
criticism on its own.  See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 52, at 582; Maclin, supra note 18; 
David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment 
History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227 (2005); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal 
Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. 
L. REV. 1559 (1996); Cloud, supra note 5, at 1730–31; Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts 
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for 
the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994).  
Contributing to this controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly—though not 
consistently—has resorted to historical analysis in its Fourth Amendment decisions.  See, 
e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (in reading the Fourth 
Amendment, “we are guided by the traditional protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing” (internal quotation 
marks removed)); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (whether the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated depends on “whether a particular governmental action . . . 
was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the 
Amendment was framed”); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (“In deciding 
whether a challenged governmental action violates the [Fourth] Amendment, we have 
taken care to inquire whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure 
when the Amendment was framed.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999) (same); 
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (there is “little doubt that the Framers of the 
Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was 
among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure”).  
For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on eighteenth-century 
common law in its evaluation of the scope of the Fourth Amendment, along with an 
increase in scholarly commentary on the same, see generally David A. Sklansky, The 
Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000). 
56 Davies, supra note 23, 178–79. 
57 Fabio Arcila, Jr., A Response to Professor Steinberg’s Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1229, 1254 (2008). 
58 59 Mass. 281 (1850). 
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warrant, not only arrested the plaintiff, but also went to his place of 
business and seized what he thought to be the stolen property.  The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.  The constable appealed, and 
the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the constable was 
authorized to arrest the plaintiff, to search his business, and to seize 
the evidence of the crime as long as the constable had reasonable 
cause to suspect that a felony had been committed.  The court then 
added: 
 It has been sometimes contended that [a warrantless arrest] was 
a violation of the great fundamental principles of our national and 
state constitutions, forbidding unreasonable searches [and seizures] 
and arrests, except by warrant founded upon a complaint made 
under oath.  Those provisions doubtless had another and different 
purpose, being in restraint of general warrants to make searches, 
and requiring warrants to issue only upon a complaint made under 
oath.  They do not conflict with the authority of constables or other 
peace-officers, or private persons under proper limitations, to arrest 
without warrant those who have committed felonies.59 
And, as Davies (and Amar, for that matter) points out, contrary to 
conventional warrant-preference doctrine, early nineteenth-century 
treatises likewise reflect the view that the Fourth Amendment was 
understood and intended to have the limited effect of constraining the 
use of general warrants.  Joseph Story, for example, explained in his 
famous Commentaries that the Fourth Amendment “is little more than 
the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law” 
requiring warrants to state with particularity “not only the name of the 
party, but also the time, and place, and nature of the offense with 
reasonable certainty.”60  Nowhere does Story mention constitutional 
constraints on warrantless searches or seizures. 
 
59 Id. at 284–85.  Other similar cases exist as well.  In Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315 (Pa. 
1814), for example, the defendant was arrested without a warrant.  He later sued for false 
imprisonment, alleging that the constable had violated the constitutional prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The court rejected the claim, explaining that 
warrantless arrests were permissible at common law, and the search and seizure provision 
“was nothing more than an affirmance of the common law.”  Id. at 318.  According to the 
court, the provision’s focus was on the issuance of general warrants, not the lawfulness of 
warrantless arrests.  To similar effect is Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 60 (1817), in which 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the state’s search and seizure provision 
“does not seem intended to restrain the legislature from authorizing arrests without 
warrant, but to guard against the abuse of warrants issued by Magistrates.” 
60 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND 
STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 678–80 (3d ed. 1858).  Thomas 
Cooley’s treatise on Constitutional Limitations likewise devotes extended attention to the 
 836 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol.87, 819 
For my purposes, however, it is not necessary to resolve the debate 
over the intended meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  It is sufficient 
to establish the fact that the debate exists.  Resolving the 
historiographical controversy becomes important only to the extent 
that the courts feel constrained to interpret the constitution to conform 
to the original intentions of its framers, a subject to which I will turn 
shortly. 
C.  The Adoption of Article I, Section 9 
With that background in mind, let us turn to the adoption of article 
I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution.  The provision dates back to 
the original constitution adopted in 1857.  Unfortunately, there is little 
in the way of an official record of the state constitutional convention.  
Charles Carey sifted through the many newspaper articles that had 
been prepared by reporters for the Portland Oregonian and the Salem 
Statesman who, as it turned out, were also delegates to the 
convention.61  His compilation of those articles often serves as the 
principal source of information about the debates over the wording of 
what would become the Oregon Constitution.  What Carey reports 
about article I, section 9, however, is that the provision was adopted 
without amendment or discussion.62  Claudia Burton and Andrew 
Grade, in their excellent A Legislative History of the Oregon 
Constitution of 1857,63 supplement Carey’s compilation with 
references to the Journal of the Convention, recently discovered 
committee reports and amendment histories, and subsequent 
 
problem of general warrants, including a lengthy note on the Wilkesite cases, but says 
nothing about warrantless searches.  THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299–308 (1868).  As late as the 1880s, John Norton 
Pomeroy described the import of the Fourth Amendment in similar terms, explaining that 
“[t]his clause of the Constitution was particularly aimed at what were known in the 
English law as general warrants.”  JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 153 (1883). 
61 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926) [hereinafter 
OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS].  For a nice summary of the convention 
proceedings, see generally David Schuman, The Creation of the Oregon Constitution, 74 
OR. L. REV. 611 (1995). 
62 Bill of Rights, OREGONIAN, Oct. 10, 1857, reprinted in OREGON CONSTITUTION AND 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 61, at 343. 
63 Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 
1857— Part I (Articles I & II), 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 469 (2001). 
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newspaper coverage of the constitution’s ratification.64  But, again, 
they report that article I, section 9 was adopted with no recorded 
discussion. 
It has been suggested on the basis of similarity in wording that 
article I, section 9 was taken from the 1851 Indiana Constitution, as 
were so many other provisions of the Oregon Constitution.65  There is 
no direct evidence of that connection, though, as Burton and Grade 
suggest, “[t]he evidence is circumstantial, but strong.”66  One 
delegate, Delazon Smith, urged the use of Indiana’s recently adopted 
bill of rights as a model for Oregon’s, asserting that the former “is 
gold refined; it is up with the progress of the age.”67  And the wording 
of article I, section 9 is indeed similar with its counterpart in the 1851 
Indiana Constitution.68  If Oregon’s provision was patterned after 
Indiana’s, however, it is clear that both were patterned after the 
Fourth Amendment, which was the common practice in mid-
nineteenth-century constitutional drafting.69 
Although patterned after the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 9 
includes a couple of interesting variations.  For example, the 
provision departs from the single-clause structure of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Article I, section 9 consists of two clauses—a 
reasonableness clause and a warrants clause—separated by a 
 
64 Id. at 514–15. 
65 See, e.g., State v. Dixson, 87 Or. App. 1, 23, 740 P.2d 1224, 1236 (1987) (Van 
Hoomissen, J., dissenting) (observing that the wording of the Oregon and 1851 Indiana 
constitutional search and seizure provisions are “virtually identical”).  The standard work 
on the sources for the Oregon Constitution generally is W.C. Palmer, The Sources of the 
Oregon Constitution, 5 OR. L. REV. 200 (1926). 
66 Burton & Grade, supra note 63, at 483. 
67 OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 61, at 101. 
68 The Indiana Constitution of 1851 declared: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
1 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA: A SOURCE BOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCUMENTS WITH HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES (1780–1851), at 
297 (Charles Kettleborough ed., 1916).  The difference between the wording of the 
Oregon and Indiana versions is that the former is not stated in the passive and declares, 
instead, that “No law shall violate” the right of the people, etc. 
69 In the mid-nineteenth century, it was common for states to pattern their constitutional 
provisions after the Federal Constitution.  As Alan Tarr explains, “[d]uring the nineteenth 
century the federal Constitution achieved an almost sacred status as the crowning work of 
an extraordinary political generation.”  G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 97 (1998). 
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conjunction and a semicolon.70  An argument could be made that the 
alteration signals that, whatever may have been understood to be the 
effect of the reasonableness clause in the Fourth Amendment, the 
framers of article I, section 9 seem to have had in mind an 
independently enforceable provision.  Consistent with that surmise is 
the fact that the reasonableness clause, unlike the Fourth Amendment, 
is not phrased in the passive voice.  It is phrased instead in more 
direct fashion, declaring that “[n]o law shall violate” the search and 
seizure rights of the people.  This phrasing is very interesting, for it 
suggests that the focus of the framers was on limiting the power of the 
legislature, not on abuses by executive branch law enforcement 
officials.  The necessary consequence of this interpretation, however, 
is that the provision was not intended to apply to warrantless searches, 
at least not those conducted in the absence of statutory authority.  But 
more about that in a bit. 
I previously mentioned the suggestion that article I, section 9 finds 
its more direct source in the parallel provision of the Indiana 
Constitution of 1851.  I have searched in vain, however, for any clues 
as to the intended meaning of the Indiana provision.  It seems that the 
Indiana search and seizure provision, like its Oregon offspring, was 
adopted with limited discussion.71  Apparently, the dearth of debate 
about the provision was typical of the Indiana convention’s lack of 
interest in the subject of individual rights generally; the focus of the 
1850–51 convention was the state’s financial woes and a focus on 
 
70 I do not want to suggest that too much emphasis be given to the placement of a single 
punctuation mark by the state constitution’s mid-nineteenth-century framers.  But the fact 
remains that the semicolon, first introduced to the English language in the mid-sixteenth 
century, had in the course of the next century become quite a popular device with which to 
divide compound sentences.  See generally Paul Bruthiaux, The Rise and Fall of the 
Semicolon: English Punctuation Theory and English Teaching Practice, 16 APPLIED 
LINGUISTICS 1 (1995) (tracing the history of the semicolon usage over four centuries).  
And, unlike commas—which had come to be sprinkled in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century prose somewhat indiscriminately—the semicolon had a well-understood function 
as a divider of separate, independent clauses.  See, e.g., J. ROBERTSON, AN ESSAY ON 
PUNCTUATION 77 (1785) (“A semicolon . . . is used for dividing a compounded sentence 
into two or more parts, not so closely connected, as those, which are separated by a 
comma; nor yet so independent o[f] each other, as those, which are distinguished by a 
colon.”). 
71 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA, supra note 68, at 297.  The only differences 
between the 1816 version of the Indiana search and seizure provision and the one adopted 
in 1851 were punctuation and the changing of several words from plural to singular forms 
(for example, the “rights of the people” in the 1816 version was changed to the “right of 
the people” in 1851).  Id. at 86, 297.  The slightly revised version was introduced to the 
1850 Constitutional Convention by a Committee on Rights and Privileges and then 
adopted by the convention without amendment by a vote of 120–1.  Id. at 297 n.42. 
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limiting the authority of the legislative branch, in particular, its 
authority to enact local and special laws.72 
One pre-war Indiana Supreme Court decision deserves mention, 
though.  In Herman v. State,73 the defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting whiskey production, and 
the court declared the statute unconstitutional.  In support of its 
conclusion, the court relied on—among several other things—the 
state’s search and seizure guarantee.  That guarantee, the court 
observed, provided that the people have the right to be secure in their 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and 
seizure.”74  Such provisions, the court declared, “fairly construed, will 
protect the citizen in the use of his industrial faculties, and in the 
enjoyment of his acquisitions.”75  This is a fascinating assertion, 
particularly for its time.  It is among the only antebellum judicial 
opinions that appear to recognize that the reasonableness clause of a 
state search and seizure guarantee has some, albeit undefined, 
independent and enforceable significance.76 
That said, it is not at all certain that the case had any influence on 
the drafting of the Oregon Constitution.  There is no indication from 
the historical record that anyone was even aware of the decision, 
much less that they interpreted it to signify that the Fourth 
Amendment and its state counterparts had broader application beyond 
the regulation of general warrants.  Moreover, Matthew Deady later 
commented that the framers of article I, section 9 understood the 
 
72 See, e.g., Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind. 1994) (discussing the fact that 
Indiana’s search and seizure guarantee was included in the state bill of rights with little 
debate); Ind. Gaming Comm’n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 299–300 (Ind. 1994) (the 
main catalysts for the drafting of the 1851 Indiana Constitution were financial concerns 
and the desire to limit the authority of the General Assembly). 
73 8 Ind. 545 (1855). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 558. 
76 The only other such case of which I am aware is Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53 (1817), 
which involved the warrantless arrest of the defendant for Sabbath-breaking.  The court 
ultimately held that the statute authorizing the warrantless arrest did not violate the state 
constitutional search and seizure guarantee.  Indeed, the court concluded that the New 
Hampshire search and seizure provision “does not seem intended to restrain the legislature 
from authorizing arrests without a warrant, but to guard against abuse of warrants issued 
by Magistrates,” a statement perfectly in line with what Davies suggests was the 
predominant view of founding era and early nineteenth century courts.  But the court also 
commented that an arrest based on “open and manifest guilt” was “no more unreasonable” 
than an arrest by a valid warrant.  The rather ambiguous statement arguably suggests that, 
implicitly, the evaluation of the validity of the arrest was subject to a constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. 
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provision to have a more modest effect.  Writing as a federal judge 
some years after the adoption of the constitution, Deady explained 
that article I, section 9 was 
copied from the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United 
States, and was placed there on account of a well-known 
controversy concerning the legality of general warrants in England 
[the Wilkes cases], shortly before the revolution, not so much to 
introduce new principles as to guard private rights already 
recognized by the common law.77 
The statement rather remarkably conforms to what Davies suggests 
would have been understood to have been the Fourth Amendment’s 
limited focus, namely, the abuse of general warrants, not the 
reasonableness of law enforcement conduct generally. 
The evidence from the time of the framing of article I, section 9 
then, is something of a mixed bag.  On the one hand, there are textual 
differences between the Oregon provision and its Fourth Amendment 
parent that could be read to suggest that the state framers had in mind 
a broader guarantee than may have been understood to have been 
afforded by the Federal Constitution at the time.  And it is at least 
temporally possible that such an effect was signaled by the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of that state’s search and seizure 
provision, which was presumably the direct model for article I, 
section 9.  Yet, on the other hand, there is nothing in the debates 
concerning the Oregon search and seizure provision to suggest that its 
framers understood or intended it to have such novel and broad-
reaching effect.  And, to the contrary, Deady recounts that the goal 
more modestly was to duplicate the Fourth Amendment’s regulation 
of abusive use of general warrants. 
II 
THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 
A.  Early Appellate Court Decisions 
Having examined the origins of article I, section 9, let us turn to the 
manner in which the Oregon courts interpreted the provision.  
Interestingly, the Oregon Reports barely mention article I, section 9 
for the first four decades following statehood.  In one 1885 case, 
Dahms v. Sears, the court ventured an opinion, in dictum, that money 
taken from a prisoner “would probably be regarded . . . as a 
 
77 Sprigg v. Stump, 8 F. 207, 213 (C.C.D. Or. 1881). 
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reasonable search and seizure.”78  Because at that time the Fourth 
Amendment had not yet been held to apply directly to the states, it is 
clear that the court was referring to article I, section 9.79  Still it is not 
so clear where the court’s conclusion about the application of that 
section came from.  The next case in which the court addressed the 
lawfulness of a search or seizure did not occur until 1901.80 
That there were initially so few appellate court decisions is not that 
surprising.  In the nineteenth century, law enforcement misconduct 
was regarded as a private trespass for which the officer might be 
personally liable.81  But such misconduct was not regarded as 
implicating constitutional search and seizure guarantees.  There was, 
as yet, no exclusionary rule, and the constitutional search and seizure 
provisions were understood to operate as limits on legislative 
authority—that is, to limit the extent to which legislatures could 
authorize unreasonable searches and seizures, not as limits on the 
behavior of executive branch or local law enforcement officers.82  As 
 
78 Dahms v. Sears, 13 Or. 47, 56, 11 P. 891, 895 (1886). 
79 It was not until 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), that the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that, by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth 
Amendment applied to the states; and it was not until 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), that the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to the states as well.  On the 
impact of the incorporation doctrine on state constitutional practice and, specifically, the 
incorporation of the criminal procedure provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights see 
generally Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The 
View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397 (2005). 
80 State v. McDaniel, 39 Or. 161, 65 P. 520 (1901). 
81 Recall that the Wilkesite cases—in which the abuses of general warrants were 
famously decried by the courts—were civil actions for damages brought against the 
messengers who executed them.  See supra notes 15–19.  This was based on the common-
law notion that an officer who conducts an unlawful arrest or search commits trespass.  
See generally Davies, supra note 12, at 624–26; Amar, supra note 41, at 774–75. 
82 See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 120 (2d ed. 1829) (the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution 
“fall within the class of restrictions on the legislative power”) (emphasis added).  In a 
similar vein, Davies observes that, during the founding period and the early nineteenth 
century, state constitutional framers had an entirely different conception of governmental 
action from the one that is familiar to modern sensibilities.  According to Davies, 
The current notion that constitutional standards, such as search-and-seizure 
standards, address the conduct of ordinary officers dates back only to the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  Under framing-era doctrine, legislation and 
court orders were governmental in character, so it was possible to conceive of an 
“unconstitutional” statute or an “unconstitutional” general warrant issued by a 
court.  However, there was no conception that an ordinary officer could act 
“unconstitutionally”; rather, an ordinary peace officer acted as the government 
only when he acted within the lawful authority of his office . . . . 
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I have noted, Oregon’s clause expresses this interpretation explicitly 
(“[n]o law shall violate”), and it was not until the twentieth century 
that the courts construed article I, section 9 to apply directly to police 
conduct.83  The Dahms case, for example, was a trespass action 
against the arresting officers, not a direct appeal from a criminal 
conviction based on the evidence seized.84 
In the meantime, the federal courts began to turn their attention to 
the Fourth Amendment for the first time in nearly 100 years.  Three 
decisions in particular proved especially significant to the 
development of search and seizure law in Oregon. 
The first is Boyd v. United States,85 an 1886 case in which the 
Court, for the first time, held that the reasonableness clause of the 
Fourth Amendment was more than a preamble.  At issue was the 
constitutionality of a federal statute that authorized federal courts in 
customs proceedings to order importers to produce invoices for 
 
Davies, supra note 23, at 90 (footnotes omitted).  The ordinary officer who acts in excess 
of authority was regarded as having acted in “deceit” of that authority, subjecting the 
officer to a private action for damages, usually for trespass or false imprisonment.  Id. at 
90–91. 
83 The Oregon Supreme Court first addressed this issue in State v. McDaniel, 115 Or. 
187, 209, 231 P. 965, 972 (1925): 
Our attention is called to the proposition that the Constitution is addressed only 
to the legislature, and there being no law of the state authorizing unconstitutional 
searches, the officers, at most, were trespassers, and the remedy is against them.  
But the Constitution is addressed not only to the legislature, but to every officer 
of the state, including the judiciary. 
Interestingly, the case was decided by a 4–3 vote.  Id.  The dissenters objected that: 
[t]he inhibition in this section is directed to the legislature.  No law is assailed in 
this appeal.  There is no claim that the search and seizure complained of were 
made by virtue of any unconstitutional statute or law of the state.  It is agreed that 
the search and seizure were both made without warrant.  The officers making the 
search and seizure were acting without a warrant or other writ.  There is no claim 
by the state that the officers were authorized by any order of any court or any law 
in conflict with said Section 9 of Article I of our state Constitution.  If the 
officers exceeded their authority, they are subject to civil and criminal liability. 
McDaniel, 115 Or. at 217, 231 P. at 927. 
 Even more interesting, on rehearing, the court reversed itself on the merits, on slightly 
different grounds.  115 Or. 234, 237 P. 373 (1925).  The opinion on rehearing did not 
address the question whether article I, section 9 was a limitation on legislative power 
alone.  Since then, however, so far as I am aware, the Oregon courts have never revisited 
the question. Instead, they have proceeded under the assumption that the state guarantee, 
notwithstanding its rather more limited phrasing, acts as a limitation on the authority of all 
governmental actors, not just the legislature. 
84 Dahms v. Sears, 13 Or. 47, 11 P. 891 (1888). 
85 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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imported goods.86  The Court concluded that such orders were 
tantamount to an unreasonable “search” for papers, contrary to the 
Fourth Amendment, and a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination.87  Interestingly, the Court invoked the historical origins 
of the Fourth Amendment in support of its conclusion, in particular, 
the jury instructions that were delivered in one of the Wilkesite cases 
in England in the 1760s.88 
The second case is Weeks v. United States.89  Weeks is perhaps best 
known for being the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is subject to exclusion at trial.  But it is important for an 
additional—and then equally novel—proposition, namely, that the 
reasonableness clause of the amendment applies to warrantless police 
conduct.90 
The third case is the Court’s 1925 decision in Carroll v. United 
States.91  As every law student knows, Carroll is the first case in 
which the Court recognized an “automobile exception” to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.92  In actuality, the Court’s 
opinion is somewhat broader.  Addressing the constitutionality of the 
warrantless search of automobiles used to transport liquor during the 
Prohibition Era, the Court concluded, after recounting the holdings of 
both Boyd and Weeks, that 
[o]n reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and 
seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, 
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the 
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that 
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and 
seizure are valid.  The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the 
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 626. 
88 The Court placed particular emphasis on the instructions to the jury in the Entick 
case, which the court said was “in the minds of those who framed the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 626–27.  As Davies points out, however, there is some doubt that the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment were aware of the instructions in Entick, given the 
relatively late publication of those instructions.  Davies, supra note 23, at 202 n.636. 
89 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
90 Id. at 388–89. 
91 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
92 See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2(a), at 459–66 (3d ed. 1996). 
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it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests 
as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.93 
This is a much broader reasonableness test than the test for which 
Carroll is now customarily remembered. 
Thus, by the 1920s, the U.S. Supreme Court had come to conclude 
that the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment was not 
merely a preamble, but an independently enforceable guarantee of 
individual rights.  The guarantee, moreover, was enforceable in 
criminal cases, requiring the exclusion of evidence seized in violation 
of its terms.  Precisely what constituted a “reasonable” search or 
seizure, however, the Court had not yet determined.  There were hints 
of a warrant requirement, but, as Carroll makes clear, nothing as clear 
as an outright presumption that judicially approved warrants were 
necessary had yet emerged.  “Reasonableness” was still determined 
on a case-by-case basis. 
By the early twentieth century, the Oregon courts also began to 
recognize that the state constitutional search and seizure guarantee 
required the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the 
constitution.94  The Oregon courts also concluded—rather more 
explicitly than did the federal courts—that the reasonableness clause 
did not necessarily require police to act pursuant to warrants, only that 
searches and seizures be reasonable under the circumstances. 
Interestingly, the Oregon courts often cited the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases as authority for their interpretations 
of article I, section 9 even though, as I have noted, the Fourth 
Amendment had not yet even been applied to the states.  One of the 
distinctive features of Oregon search and seizure cases in the first half 
of the century, in fact, is that the courts frequently referred to article I, 
section 9, the Fourth Amendment, and cases construing each rather 
interchangeably. 
For example, in one of the earlier article I, section 9 decisions, 
State v. McDaniel,95 the defendant challenged the lawfulness of the 
 
93 267 U.S. at 149. 
94 The Oregon Supreme Court first recognized an exclusionary rule rooted in article I, 
section 9 in State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443, 204 P. 958 (1922).  The court noted that, in the 
past, it had held that “the relevancy of a given article is not affected by the circumstances 
that it was wrongfully seized.”  103 Or. at 494, 204 P. at 975.  But, after discussing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks, the Oregon court concluded that “[t]his rule of 
practice sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States ought, for the same reasons 
which recommended it to the court, be adopted and followed by the courts of this state.”  
Id. 
95 39 Or. 161, 65 P. 520 (1901). 
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police seizure of an inculpatory letter in the course of his arrest.  He 
challenged the seizure on both state and federal constitutional 
grounds.  The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that a search 
incident to a valid arrest was reasonable, without making clear which 
constitution the court was referring to.  In a similar vein is State v. 
Laundy,96 in which the court noted that “[t]he defendant also relies 
upon article I, § 9, of our state Constitution, which, although not in 
the identical language, is in effect and meaning the same as 
[Amendment] IV of the federal Constitution.”97 
That is not to say that, even very early on, the Oregon Supreme 
Court did not appreciate the independent legal significance of the 
state constitution.  In State v. McDaniel,98 for example, the state 
argued that the Oregon court was not bound by the exclusionary rule 
that the U.S. Supreme Court in Weeks had recognized the Fourth 
Amendment to require.  The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the 
larger principle, commenting that “state courts are not bound by the 
federal authorities.”99  Having said that, however, the court went on 
expressly to adopt the Weeks exclusionary rule, “not as necessarily 
binding upon this court, but for ‘the same reasons which 
recommended it’” to the U.S. Supreme Court.100 
Oregon search and seizure decisions from the first third of the 
twentieth century are especially interesting as they relate to the 
question whether the reasonableness clause of article I, section 9 
presumptively required warrants.  Following the lead of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Carroll, the Oregon court said—with a categorical 
emphasis that sounds foreign to modern, warrant-preference 
sensibilities—“no.” 
Consider State v. De Ford,101 a Prohibition-era case in which the 
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrantless stop and 
search of his vehicle for illegal liquor.  The defendant contended that 
the state constitution required a warrant and, without one, the 
exclusion of the damning evidence.  The Oregon Supreme Court 
disagreed.  The court began by summarizing the U.S. Supreme 
 
96 103 Or. 443, 204 P. 958 (1922). 
97 103 Or. at 492, 204 P. at 974. 
98 115 Or. 187, 231 P. 965 (1925), rev’d on reh’g, 115 Or. 234, 237 P. 373 (1925). 
99 115 Or. at 200, 231 P. at 970. 
100 115 Or. at 203, 231 P. at 970. 
101 120 Or. 444, 250 P. 220 (1927). 
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Court’s decisions in Boyd and Carroll.102  It then distilled (excuse the 
pun) from those decisions the following guiding principle: “It thus 
appears that the possession of the warrant is not the controlling 
consideration of whether a search is reasonable or unreasonable.  An 
officer armed with a warrant may make an unreasonable search.  An 
officer without a warrant may make a reasonable search.”103  Quoting 
from a recently decided Mississippi Supreme Court decision on the 
same point, the court explained that the lawfulness of a search or a 
seizure is not determined by the presence or absence of a warrant; 
rather, “[i]t is a judicial question to be determined by the court in each 
case, taking into consideration . . . the circumstances under which the 
search or seizure was made, and the presence or absence of probable 
cause therefor.”104 
 
102 120 Or. at 450–52, 250 P. at 222–23. 
103 120 Or. at 452, 250 P. at 223. 
104 Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 103 S. 483, 485 (1925)).  The court’s decision in this 
case is especially interesting given the disposition of an earlier one involving the same 
issue.  In State v. McDaniel, 115 Or. 187, 231 P. 965 (1925), the court addressed the 
lawfulness of a warrantless search and seizure of unlawful liquor found on the defendant at 
the time of arrest.  Initially, the court reversed the conviction.  Justice Martin Pipes, joined 
by two other justices (a fourth justice concurred in the result only), concluded that, subject 
to limited exceptions, article I, section 9 requires law enforcement officers to act pursuant 
to the authority of a warrant.  115 Or. at 194, 231 P. at 967–68.  The court specifically 
addressed the question whether a warrantless search can be reasonable in the following 
terms: 
It is said that a search with a warrant may be unreasonable, and a search without 
a warrant be reasonable and lawful, if reasonable.  The first proposition is a legal 
impossibility. . . . 
 Nor is the second proposition any sounder.  If he makes a search without a 
warrant, however polite, gentle, or considerate he may be, the search is 
unreasonable, because it is unlawful.  The standard of reasonableness is not the 
conduct of the officer, but the possession of the warrant. 
115 Or. at 210, 231 P. at 972.  Justice Oliver Coshow, joined by two other justices, 
dissented.  Among other things, he contended that the “[t]he inhibition of [Article I,] 
Section 9 is not against all searches but only against unreasonable searches.  The presence 
of a warrant is not the sole test of the reasonableness of a search.  A search, with a warrant, 
may be unreasonable, and without a warrant, reasonable.”  115 Or. at 218, 231 P. at 975 
(Coshow, J., dissenting).  On rehearing, one of the justices in the majority switched sides, 
and the case flipped on the ground that the warrantless search was reasonable, because it 
was incident to the defendant’s arrest.  State v. McDaniel, 115 Or. 234, 237 P. 373 (1925).  
In State v. De Ford, the court’s opinion was drafted by none other than Justice Coshow, 
and the opinion includes the very same lines about the scope of article I, section 9 that 
appeared in his dissenting opinion in McDaniel.  There was no dissent in De Ford.  120 
Or. 444, 250 P. 220 (1926). 
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To the same effect is State v. Lee,105 decided the same year as De 
Ford.  In that case, a county sheriff secured a warrant to search the 
premises of a person who had been suspected of operating an 
unlawful still.  After searching the premises, the sheriff went outside 
to the barnyards where he smelled the odor of mash, apparently 
emanating from a barn on a neighbor’s property.  Without a warrant 
to search that property, the sheriff entered onto the neighbor’s land 
and searched the neighbor’s barn, where of course he found a still.  
After being arrested for the unlawful operation of a Prohibition-era 
still, the neighbor challenged the lawfulness of the search of his barn.  
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the search was reasonable 
and, thus, not unlawful.  Quoting from the same Mississippi case that 
the court had relied on in De Ford, the court concluded that the 
reasonableness of a search does not depend on the presence of 
warrant, but on the circumstances of each case.106  In this case, the 
court said, the sheriff reasonably believed, through the operation of 
his olfactory senses, that a crime was being committed, and that was 
enough to justify the search, arrest, and seizure.107 
That would remain the state of things for at least two decades.  
Both De Ford and Lee were cited as recently as 1959 for the 
proposition that “there is no constitutional barrier to a search based 
upon information alone,” so long as the officer had probable cause 
before engaging in the warrrantless search or seizure.108 
B.  The State Constitutional Revolution 
By the 1960s, however, the Oregon Supreme Court began viewing 
article I, section 9 in different terms.  In contrast with De Ford and 
Lee, the court began characterizing the Oregon Constitution as 
presuming that warrants are required, unless a search or seizure 
occurred incident to a lawful arrest.  Still, the signals were somewhat 
mixed. 
In State v. Chinn,109 for example, the court addressed the 
lawfulness of a warrantless police search of the defendant’s apartment 
on a tip that a man who had committed sexual abuse lived there.  The 
police knocked on the door and were allowed to enter by one of the 
 
105 120 Or. 643, 253 P. 533 (1927). 
106 120 Or. at 649, 253 P. at 535. 
107 120 Or. at 650–51, 253 P. at 535. 
108 State v. Hoover, 219 Or. 288, 299, 347 P.2d 69, 75 (1959). 
109 231 Or. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962). 
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occupants, who told them that the defendant was not present.  The 
police proceeded to search the premises, and, when finished, decided 
to remain at the apartment, watch television, and wait for the 
defendant to return.  When the defendant returned, they arrested him 
and took with them evidence that they had discovered during the 
search.  When the defendant challenged the lawfulness of the 
warrantless search, the state argued that the evidence was 
constitutionally seized during an arrest.  The Oregon Supreme Court 
agreed. 
The court began with the declaration that the Oregon Constitution 
“protects the home against invasion by the police unless the police 
first have procured a search warrant.”110  Cited as authority for that 
proposition was a Fourth Amendment case, United States v. 
Lefkowitz,111 which, interestingly, did not quite go that far.112  The 
court then observed that a “notable exception to the demand for a 
search warrant is, of course, the search made as an incident of a 
lawful arrest.”113  Turning its attention to the question whether the 
search was, indeed, “incident” to the arrest, the court held that the 
answer depended upon whether the officers acted reasonably.  The 
court explained that a relevant factor was whether the officers had the 
opportunity to obtain a warrant.  Noting that the officers did have 
such an opportunity (while they were watching television), the court 
nevertheless commented that that was not dispositive:  
We cannot say the failure to obtain a search warrant rendered the 
search or the seizure unreasonable.  If the mere failure to obtain a 
search warrant makes every search and seizure illegal even though a 
perfectly reasonable accompaniment of a lawful arrest, then the 
word “unreasonable” has been read out of the constitution.114 
 
110 231 Or. at 265, 373 P.2d at 395. 
111 285 U.S. 452 (1932). 
112 Lefkowitz actually was a case in which the police obtained a warrant to arrest the 
defendant, went to his residence to effect the arrest, and proceeded to search the premises 
incident to that arrest.  The Court said that the lawfulness of the search depended on 
whether it was either authorized by the warrant or reasonably incident to the arrest.  The 
Court ultimately said that the warrantless search was not reasonably incident to the arrest.  
In the process, the Court commented that “[s]ecurity against unlawful searches is more 
likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and 
sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of 
persons accused of crime.”  Id. at 464. 
113 231 Or. at 266, 373 P.2d at 395. 
114 231 Or. at 273, 373 P.2d at 398. 
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In the meantime, however, the federal courts were beginning to 
characterize their own Fourth Amendment case law as recognizing a 
preference for warrants.  At least as early as the late 1940s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court claimed from the Fourth Amendment an implicit 
requirement that searches and seizures be authorized by warrants.115  
By the 1960s, the Court went so far as to say that, in cases that might 
otherwise be regarded as unreasonable, the presence of a warrant can 
make the difference.116  There emerged from the federal cases of the 
era what became known as the “per se rule” of warrants, derived from 
Katz v. United States,117 in which the Court declared, 
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the 
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes and 
that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.118 
The Oregon courts quickly followed suit, and reference to the per se 
rule—often with the foregoing quote from Katz—became a regular 
feature of state search and seizure opinions.119 
By the 1970s, however, the Oregon courts began to acknowledge at 
least the possibility that Fourth Amendment decisions did not control 
their interpretation and application of article I, section 9, even if they 
ultimately chose to follow the pattern of the federal constitutional 
cases.  In State v. Florance,120 for example, the Oregon Supreme 
Court faced the question whether to follow the lead of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in relaxing the requirements for a valid search 
incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment.121  The Oregon court 
 
115 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948). 
116 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (“[I]n a doubtful or marginal 
case [of probable cause] a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it 
would fall.”). 
117 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
118 Id. at 357  (alteration original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(footnote omitted). 
119 See, e.g., State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, 260, 598 P.2d 684, 687 (1979); State v. 
Greene, 285 Or. 337, 340–41, 591 P.2d 1362, 1363–64 (1979); State v. Miller, 269 Or. 
328, 333, 524 P.2d 1399, 1401–02 (1974); State v. Douglas, 260 Or. 60, 67, 488 P.2d 
1366, 1369–70 (1971). 
120 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974). 
121 In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), the Supreme Court 
redefined the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest so that the search need not be 
reasonably related to the particular offense for which the defendant was arrested or 
necessitated by officer safety concerns. 
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noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had chosen to depart from earlier 
precedent in relating those requirements.  The court explained that it 
could choose to follow that path or adhere to the earlier line of cases.  
“We can do so,” the court explained, “by interpreting Article I, § 9, of 
the Oregon constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures as being more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment of the 
federal constitution.”122  Having said that, the court chose to follow 
the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court, because of what the Oregon court 
characterized as a “need of simplification for law enforcement 
personnel, lawyers and judges.”123  There was a vigorous dissent, 
authored by Chief Justice K.J. O’Connell, who questioned the need 
for such simplification of criminal procedure and proposed that the 
Oregon courts instead boldly determine, independently of federal 
cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment, what article I, section 9 
means. 
Eight years later, in State v. Caraher,124 the Oregon Supreme 
Court did just that.  The case involved the warrantless search of the 
defendant’s purse (and the coin compartment inside) during an arrest 
for possession of a controlled substance.  When the defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of the search, the state responded that 
the case was controlled by Florance.  The Oregon Supreme Court 
decided that it had been wrong in Florance to follow so rigidly 
Federal Fourth Amendment precedents, particularly in the name of 
uniformity and simplicity.  “Eight years of uniformity with U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions,” the court tartly observed, “has not . . . 
brought simplification to the law of search and seizure in this 
state.”125  The court then openly declared independence from the 
Fourth Amendment: 
[W]e remain free, even after Florance, to interpret our own 
constitutional provision regarding search and seizure and to impose 
higher standards on searches and seizures under our own 
constitution than are required by the federal constitution.  This is 
part of a state court’s duty of independent constitutional analysis.  
That a state is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater 
restrictions on police activity than those that the United States 
Supreme Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional 
 
122 270 Or. at 182, 527 P.2d at 1208. 
123 270 Or. at 183, 527 P.2d at 1209. 
124 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982). 
125 293 Or. at 749, 653 P.2d at 946. 
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standards is beyond question.  Indeed, the states are “independently 
responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.”126 
The court explained that “[t]his is not a revolutionary idea but one 
that is founded in the most fundamental principles of federalism and 
in the history of state constitutions.”127 
During this period of state constitutional revolution, the Oregon 
Supreme Court declared not only the independence of the Oregon 
Constitution, but also its primacy.  This preeminance meant that, in 
constitutional cases, the courts always would turn first to the state 
constitution and resort to federal constitutional analysis only if the 
state constitution did not afford complete relief.128  Known as the 
“first-things-first” doctrine, this meant that the Oregon courts were 
obligated to examine applicable state constitutional provisions before 
turning to the Federal Constitution even in cases in which the parties 
neglected to mention, or intentionally disclaimed, state constitutional 
grounds for their arguments.129 
Resort to the state constitution then became common, especially in 
search and seizure cases.  The Oregon courts often departed from 
Federal Fourth Amendment analysis and concluded that article I, 
section 9 affords greater protections to individual rights than does its 
federal counterpart.  Thus, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court 
 
126 293 Or. at 750–51, 653 P.2d at 946–47 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 
1099 (1975)) (citations omitted). 
127 293 Or. at 756 n.13, 653 P.2d at 950 n.13. 
128 The classic explanation of the “primacy” approach to state constitutionalism may be 
found in Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981): 
The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law, including its constitutional law, 
before reaching a federal constitutional claim.  This is required, not for the sake 
either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right 
claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is 
fully met by state law. 
129 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 265, 666 P.2d 1316, 1320–21 (1983) 
(courts are obligated to address applicable state constitutional provisions even when 
parties fail to address them); State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 233 n.1, 630 P.2d 810, 812 n.1 
(1981) (courts are obligated to address issues of state constitutional law even when parties 
disclaim reliance on the state constitution).  On the theoretical basis for the first-things-
first approach to state constitutional interpretation, see generally Wallace P. Carson, Jr., 
“Last Things Last”: A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State Courts, 19 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 641 (1983); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the 
States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).  For a nice summary of the 
arguments about the first-things-first approach, as well as competing views of state 
constitutional interpretation in the specific area of search and seizure, see generally Robert 
F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search and Seizure Cases, 77 MISS. L.J. 
225 (2007). 
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has expressly repudiated the familiar federal “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” analysis for determining what is a “search” within the 
meaning of article I, section 9.130  It has also rejected the federal 
“open fields doctrine” and extended article I, section 9 protection to 
the curtilage of an individual’s property.131  And it has rejected 
deterrence as the justification for an exclusionary rule under article I, 
section 9, contrary to federal cases applying the exclusionary rule 
derived from the Fourth Amendment.132 
In the ensuing years, as resort to the state constitution became the 
norm, the Oregon courts became more self-conscious about how they 
were determining the meaning of the constitution.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court eventually articulated a preference for a jurisprudence 
of original intent as the basis for judicial interpretation of provisions 
of the original 1857 constitution.  That intent, the court explained, is 
ascertained by examining the wording of the provision at issue, “the 
historical circumstances that led to its creation,” and the “case law 
surrounding it.”133  Cases construing provisions of the original 
constitution—including provisions related to the right to a jury 
 
130 See, e.g., State v. Tanner, 304 Or. 312, 321 n.7, 745 P.2d 757, 762 n.7 (1987) (“One 
difficulty with analyzing privacy interests in terms of ‘expectations’ is that the issue is one 
of right, not expectation.  Rights under section 9 are defined not by the privacy one 
expects but by the privacy one has a right to expect from the government.”) (emphasis in 
original); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 164, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (1988) (“This court 
has expressed doubts about the wisdom of defining Article I, section 9, searches in terms 
of ‘reasonable expectations of privacy.’  Because the phrase continues to appear so often 
in arguments, we here expressly reject it for defining searches under Article I, section 9.” 
(citations omitted)). 
131 State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or. 195, 208, 766 P.2d 1015, 1022 (1988). 
132 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or. 366, 963 P.2d 642 (1998) (exclusion is not 
predicated on a policy of deterrence but is instead a personal right); Tanner, 304 Or. at 
315, 745 P.2d at 758 (unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the rule of article I, 
section 9 “is predicated on the personal right of a criminal defendant to be free from an 
‘unreasonable search, or seizure’”). 
133 Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415–16, 840 P.2d 65, 67 (1992).  The practice of 
interpreting the Oregon Constitution in light of the intentions of its framers actually dates 
back at least to the 1930s.  See, e.g., Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or. 175, 178, 285 P. 205, 206 
(1930) (the object of constitutional interpretation is “to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted it”).  But, 
until the state constitutional revolution, the Oregon courts were never very consistent 
about adhering to that interpretive approach.  There is, in fact, some question whether—
even after the revolution—the courts have been consistent in their approaches to the 
interpretation of the state constitution.  See generally Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for 
Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 
793 (2000) (following the state constitutional revolution, the Oregon courts apply at least 
six different interpretive approaches to the Oregon Constitution). 
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trial,134 the right to bear arms,135 the right to remedies,136 the right to 
proportional punishment,137 and the prohibition against ex post facto 
laws138—commonly relied on extensive inquiries into the historical 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the state’s nineteenth-
century constitution with a view to reconstructing what the framers 
would have understood those provisions to mean. 
C.  The Post-Revolution Warrant-Preference Rule 
Interestingly, though, the Oregon courts have not often applied that 
originalist interpretive approach to cases arising under article I, 
section 9.  In fact, on the specific question whether the reasonableness 
clause of the Oregon search and seizure guarantee implicitly states a 
preference for warrants, the Oregon courts have never ventured 
beyond citations to Federal Fourth Amendment cases.  Instead, even 
after the revolutionary decision in Caraher, the Oregon Supreme 
Court adopted the federal warrant-preference rule wholesale, without 
discussion, and with only citations to Fourth Amendment cases. 
The post-revolution decision usually cited for Oregon’s warrant-
preference rule is State v. Davis.139  The precise issue in that case was 
the lawfulness of the warrantless entry into the defendant’s home, 
which the state contended was reasonable under article I, section 9 
because of circumstances amounting to an emergency.  The court 
began its analysis with the statement that “[w]e start with the 
proposition that warrantless entries and searches of premises are per 
se unreasonable unless falling within one of the few ‘specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant 
 
134 Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or. 62, 69, 987 P.2d 463, 468 (1999) 
(“[W]hatever the right to a jury trial in a civil case meant in 1857, it has the same meaning 
today.”). 
135 State v. Hirsch, 338 Or. 622, 114 P.3d 1104 (2005) (tracing extensive history of 
right to bear arms in resolving dispute over constitutionality of felon-in-possession 
statute); State v. Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 400, 692 P.2d 610, 612 (1984) (“The appropriate 
inquiry in the case at bar is whether a kind of weapon, as modified by its modern design 
and function, is of the sort commonly used by individuals for personal defense during 
either the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, or in 1859 when Oregon’s constitution 
was adopted.” (footnote omitted)). 
136 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 94–115, 23 P.3d 333, 340–51 
(2001) (tracing history of Oregon’s remedy clause from Magna Carta, to Sir Edward 
Coke’s Second Institute, to Blackstone’s Commentaries, to early state constitutions and 
declarations of rights). 
137 State v. Wheeler, 343 Or. 652, 175 P.3d 438 (2007). 
138 State v. Cookman, 324 Or. 19, 29–30, 920 P.2d 1086, 1092–93 (1996). 
139 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983). 
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requirement.”140  The internal quotation was, of course, the familiar 
phrasing of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Katz.  The Oregon 
court also cited two other pre-revolution decisions, State v. Peller141 
and State v. Matsen/Wilson,142 both of which cited Fourth 
Amendment cases for a warrant-preference rule.  The case contained 
no examination of the wording of article I, section 9 nor of the 
historical circumstances surrounding its adoption, only citation to the 
three cases mentioned.  Since then, the court has never reexamined 
the question.143 
Not that the Oregon courts have completely abjured references to 
history and original intentions when interpreting and applying article 
I, section 9.  Even before the state constitutional revolution, the 
Oregon Supreme Court occasionally referred to the historical origins 
of article I, section 9 and of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Blackburn/Barber is a good example.144  At issue in that case was the 
extent to which a search warrant was sufficiently particular under the 
state and federal constitutions.  The Oregon Supreme Court noted that 
[b]oth the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution require a search warrant 
“particularly describing the place to be searched.”  It has been 
explained that “the historical motivation for this constitutional 
mandate was a fear of ‘general warrants,’ giving the bearer an 
unlimited authority to search and seize.”  More specifically, the aim 
of the requirement of particularity is to protect the citizen’s interest 
in freedom from governmental intrusion through the invasion of his 
privacy.  If the search warrant describes premises in such a way that 
 
140 295 Or. at 237, 666 P.2d at 809. 
141 287 Or. 255, 260, 598 P.2d 684, 687 (1979). 
142 287 Or. 581, 601 P.2d 784 (1979). 
143 The usual practice is to declare the warrant preference rule, and cite either Davis or a 
more recent case that relied on Davis.  See, e.g., State v. Meharry, 342 Or. 173, 177, 149 
P.3d 1155, 1157 (2006) (“[A] search conducted without a warrant is deemed unreasonable 
unless it ‘fall[s] within one of the few specifically established and carefully delineated 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” (citing State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231, 235, 759 
P.2d 1054 (1988)) (second alteration original); State v. Snow, 337 Or. 219, 223, 94 P.3d 
872, 874 (2004) (“Under Article I, section 9, ‘[w]arrantless entries and searches of 
premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically 
established and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” (citing State 
v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231, 235, 759 P.2d 1054 (1988) (alteration original)).  In some cases, 
even after Davis, the court has referred to the warrant preference rule and cited Katz as 
authority.  See, e.g., State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 225, 709 P.2d 225, 241–42 (1985) 
(“Warrantless entries and searches of premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall 
within one of the few, carefully circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement.”) 
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
144 266 Or. 28, 511 P.2d 381 (1973). 
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it makes possible the invasion of this interest in privacy without the 
foundation of probable cause for the search, the warrant is too broad 
and therefore constitutionally defective.145 
Interestingly, the court cited as authority for its brief historical 
digression the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boyd, which, it will 
be recalled, relied on the asserted importance of the eighteenth-
century Wilkesite cases in the framing of the Fourth Amendment.  
The court has relied on that statement from Blackburn/Barber in a 
number of subsequent cases concerning the particularity requirement 
of article I, section 9.146 
More often than not, the historical origins of state and federal 
search and seizure guarantees find prominence in dissenting opinions.  
Notable in that respect is Chief Justice Edwin Peterson’s dissent in 
State v. Bridewell.147  At issue in that case was the lawfulness of the 
police entry onto the defendant’s land without a warrant.  The state 
argued that the police were justified in entering the defendant’s 
premises without a warrant because of a reasonable concern for his 
safety, based on information supplied by a friend some twelve hours 
earlier.  The majority disposed of the case in short order.  It started 
with the familiar declaration that “[w]arrantless entries and searches 
of premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the 
few specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.”148  Cited as authority was a single case: State v. 
Davis.  The court recognized that the presence of exigent 
circumstances could provide just such an exception, but it concluded 
that, on the facts of that case, insufficient exigency existed. 
Chief Justice Peterson dissented.  He argued that, because the 
police entered the defendant’s premises to investigate a report of a 
friend who was concerned that the defendant might have been hurt, 
the entry “was not a ‘search’ as that term was understood in the state 
and federal constitutions in 1791 and 1859 and is not a search within 
the present day meaning of that term.”149  In support of that assertion, 
 
145 266 Or. at 34, 511 P.2d at 384. 
146 See, e.g., State v. Reid, 319 Or. 65, 69–70, 872 P.2d 416, 418 (1994); State v. 
Ingram, 313 Or. 139, 144, 831 P.2d 674, 676–77 (1992); State v. Devine, 307 Or. 341, 
343–44, 786 P.2d 913, 914 (1989). 
147 306 Or. 231, 241–47, 759 P.2d 1054, 1060–64 (1988) (Peterson, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
148 306 Or. at 235, 759 P.2d at 1057. 
149 306 Or. at 253, 759 P.2d at 1067–68 (Peterson, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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Chief Justice Peterson supplied a lengthy account of the origins of 
state and federal search and seizure provisions.  In particular, the 
discussion included an account of the jury instructions in the 
eighteenth-century English Wilkesite cases and reference to the 
American colonial resistance to the use of writs of assistance before 
the Revolutionary War.150  The essence of the historical events that 
led to the adoption of the state and federal search and seizure 
guarantees, he generalized, was that government was using search and 
seizures “to persecute nonconformists and repress the rights of the 
governed,” which he asserted simply was not the case when the 
modern police entered the defendant’s property.151  The majority 
ignored the dissent’s historical analysis. 
The same thing occurred in another Oregon Supreme Court case, 
State v. Atkinson.152  The issue in that case was whether a warrantless 
police inventory of the contents of an impounded car violated article 
I, section 9.  The majority, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Peterson, concluded that, in general, a warrantless inventory is 
permissible under article I, section 9 if it is conducted “pursuant to a 
properly authorized administrative program, designed and 
systematically administered so that the inventory involves no exercise 
of discretion by the law enforcement person directing or taking the 
inventory.”153  The majority concluded that the lawfulness of the 
particular inventory at issue, however, could not be determined 
because the record did not reveal the authority under which the police 
in that case had impounded the vehicle.154 
Justice Betty Roberts dissented.  She read the majority opinion to 
hold that noncriminal or regulatory searches are not subject to the 
restrictions of article I, section 9, a position with which she 
vigorously disagreed.  According to Justice Roberts, “[h]istorically, 
the government abuses which sparked enactment of our federal fourth 
amendment were carried out against the American colonies by 
government officials fulfilling what we would probably consider 
today to be an administrative or regulatory function, that is, customs 
 
150 306 Or. at 241–47, 759 P.2d at 1060–64 (Peterson, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
151 306 Or. at 247, 759 P.2d at 1064 (Peterson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
152 298 Or. 1, 688 P.2d 832 (1984). 
153 298 Or. at 10, 688 P.2d at 837. 
154 298 Or. at 11, 688 P.2d at 837–38. 
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control and the regulation of commerce.”155  At that point, Justice 
Roberts recounted the history of the origins of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Citing both Lasson and Landynski, she gave particular 
emphasis to the Writs of Assistance Case and to the importance of 
early state constitutional prohibitions against the use of general 
warrants.156  The majority, however, did not even mention the 
dissenting opinion, much less respond to it. 
A similar fate also befell a dissenting opinion in State v. 
Dixson/Digby,157 an Oregon Court of Appeals case about whether to 
depart from the federal “open fields” doctrine.  A plurality concluded 
that the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures in 
article I, section 9 extended beyond the curtilage of a residence and 
included as well the “open fields” beyond.  The plurality based that 
conclusion on, among other things, the historical view that 
Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment are the direct 
product of the experience that Americans had during the pre-
revolutionary period with uncontrolled executive power.  The 
colonists (and their supporters in England) looked to safeguards 
against arbitrary searches and seizures as one of the bulwarks of the 
liberty for which they fought the Revolution. 
According to the plurality, there is inherent in that history a concern 
for protecting the right to privacy, “and we must construe the state 
constitution to protect that right.”158 
Judge George Van Hoomissen dissented.  Among other things, he 
took issue with the plurality’s resort to the history of the state and 
federal search and seizure guarantees.  According to Judge Van 
Hoomissen, the history of those guarantees shows that the principal 
concern was “[t]he requirement that all search warrants be 
specific.”159  The antecedent history of the Fourth Amendment, he 
observed, “has two princip[al] sources: the colonists’ antipathy for the 
general search warrant and the provisions in the early state 
constitutions designed to prevent general warrants.”160  Quoting an 
early federal district court decision concerning the origins of the 
Fourth Amendment, Judge Van Hoomissen urged that, in fact, the 
 
155 298 Or. at 14, 688 P.2d at 840 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
156 298 Or. at 15–16, 688 P.2d at 840–41. 
157 87 Or. App. 1, 740 P.2d 1224 (1987). 
158 87 Or. App. at 6–7, 740 P.2d at 1226–27. 
159 87 Or. App. at 26, 740 P.2d at 1238 (Van Hoomissen, J., dissenting). 
160 87 Or. App. at 27 n.11, 740 P.2d at 1239 n.11 (Van Hoomissen, J., dissenting). 
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search and seizure guarantees were never intended to apply to 
warrantless police conduct at all.161 
The Oregon Supreme Court had the last word on the subject, 
deciding not to adopt the federal distinction between curtilage and 
open fields.  The court mentioned the fact that Judge Van Hoomissen 
had dissented, but it did not otherwise address his historical argument 
that the search and seizure provision was never intended to apply to 
warrantless police activity in the first place. 
I once ventured to mention in an opinion the subject of history and 
the intentions of the framers of the Fourth Amendment and of article 
I, section 9.  In Weber v. Oakridge School District 76,162 I observed 
that, although the Oregon Supreme Court had broadly stated a 
commitment to originalist constitutional interpretation, it had never 
turned its attention to the intended meaning of the state’s 
constitutional search and seizure guarantee.163  I suggested that, if the 
court were truly committed to that task, it might prove to have serious 
consequences for the development of search and seizure doctrine, 
particularly in light of recent scholarship suggesting that the framers 
might not have understood that state and federal search and seizure 
guarantees included a preference for search warrants.164  The Oregon 
Supreme Court, however, denied a petition for review of the 
decision.165 
Curiously, in State v. Carter,166 one of its most recent article I, 
section 9 opinions, the court resorted to the history of state and 
federal search and seizure guarantees.  Indeed, the court—for the first 
time, so far as I can determine—expressly interpreted the provision 
by applying the originalist approach of Priest v. Pearce.167  At issue 
in that case was the validity of a warrant that authorized the police to 
search for specified items, but did not authorize the police to seize 
those items.  The defendant argued that the warrant was invalid in 
light of the requirement in article I, section 9 that warrants 
“particularly describ[e]” both the “place to be searched, and the . . . 
 
161 87 Or. App. at 26 n.10, 740 P.2d at 1238 n.10 (quoting United States v. Snyder, 278 
F. 650, 652 (D.C.W. Va. 1922)) (Van Hoomissen, J., dissenting). 
162 184 Or. App. 415, 56 P.3d 504 (2002). 
163 184 Or. App. at 429–30, 56 P.3d at 512–13. 
164 184 Or. App. at 430 n.3, 56 P.3d at 513. 
165 335 Or. 422, 69 P.3d 1233 (2003). 
166 342 Or. 39, 147 P.3d 1151 (2006). 
167 314 Or. 411, 415–16, 840 P.2d 65, 67 (1992). 
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thing to be seized.”168  The Oregon Supreme Court, quoting Priest, 
responded that, “[i]n analyzing defendant’s argument, we consider the 
specific wording [of article I, section 9], the case law surrounding it, 
and the historical circumstances that led to its creation.”169  The court 
then did just that.  After carefully examining the precise wording of 
the participial phrase that is the warrant clause of article I, section 9, 
the court concluded that the text of the provision simply does not state 
that authorization of both search and seizure is required.  The court 
then turned to the history of the provision, but limited its discussion to 
reciting the familiar quotation from Blackburn/Barber and, 
interestingly, a citation to Chief Justice Peterson’s dissent in 
Bridewell.170  On the basis of that brief historical analysis, the court 
concluded that “[t]he history confirms what the text of Article I, 
section 9, and this court’s cases construing it demonstrate.”171 
III 
PARTING THOUGHTS 
As I mentioned at the outset, the story of the interpretation of 
article I, section 9 is the story of Oregon constitutionalism writ small.  
What that means is that the interpretation of the provision, like much 
of Oregon constitutionalism, is a bit of a muddle.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court convincingly declared independence from Fourth 
Amendment analysis in Caraher, but, as the ink dried on the reporters 
for that decision, the same court declared that the state constitution 
embodies a warrant-preference rule, citing as authority—of all 
things—Fourth Amendment decisions.  Meanwhile, the court has 
developed a marked interest in interpreting the original provisions of 
the Oregon Constitution with a view to implementing the 
understandings and intentions of its nineteenth-century framers.  Yet 
the court has shown an odd and unexplained disinclination to apply 
that very analysis to article I, section 9.  The court, however, has not 
totally avoided referring to history in its search and seizure cases.  As 
its recent decision in Carter makes clear, the court does resort to such 
originalist interpretive technique in article I, section 9 cases, just not 
very often.  We are left to wonder why. 
 
168 Carter, 342 Or. at 42, 147 P.3d at 1152. 
169 Id. (second alteration original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 314 Or. at 43–44, 840 P.2d at 1152–53. 
171 314 Or. at 44, 840 P.2d at 1153. 
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The answer to the question, I submit, is of more than just academic 
interest.  As I have attempted to demonstrate, resort to the intentions 
of the framers of article I, section 9 could require a major overhaul of 
the state’s search and seizure jurisprudence.  In particular, it could 
well be the case that the framers of the Oregon Constitution had no 
notion that article I, section 9 would apply to warrantless seizures at 
all.  Or it could be that the framers understood that, if it applied, it 
stated no particular preference for warrants, rather—as the early 
twentieth-century Oregon cases categorically held—a broad 
requirement of reasonableness.  Depending on how the courts sort 
through the historiographical debate about the origins of the Fourth 
Amendment and the transformation of such basic conceptions as 
“reasonableness” and “due process” over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the resulting law of search and seizure could be quite 
different. 
In my view, these problems are unnecessary.  In the first place, the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s professed commitment to a constitutional 
jurisprudence of original intent is, as I have observed on other 
occasions, mystifying.172  The court has never explained why it feels 
limited by the understandings and intentions of the nineteenth-century 
framers of the Oregon Constitution.173  Certainly, the historical 
 
172 Landau, supra note 133, at 836 (“In no case of which I am aware has any Oregon 
court attempted to defend the legitimacy of originalist constitutional interpretation.  Its 
legitimacy is taken for granted.”).  The literature on the arguments for and against 
originalism as a method of state or federal constitutional interpretation is truly enormous.  
For a good introduction to the debate, see generally Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism 
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989). 
173 The closest the court has come to providing an explanation seems to be the court’s 
opinion in Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 54–55, 11 P.3d 228, 237 (2000), in 
which the court stated that “it long has been the practice of this court ‘to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted 
it.’”  (alteration original) (quoting Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or. 175, 178, 285 P. 205, 206 
(1930)).  Actually, there are probably even older cases that the court could have cited to.  
See, e.g., Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Or. 515, 517; Noland v. Costello, 2 Or. 57, 58–59.  The 
problem is that, in countless other cases decided before Stranahan, the court had 
interpreted the Oregon Constitution without mentioning the intention of its framers.  See, 
e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 317 Or. 172, 855 P.2d 608 (1993) (state constitutional 
takings clause interpreted without reference to framers’ intentions); State v. Mai, 294 Or. 
269, 272, 656 P.2d 315, 317 (1982) (state constitutional compulsory process clause is 
construed “in the same way as the [U.S.] Supreme Court construed the virtually identical 
federal counterpart” and without reference to meaning intended by Oregon constitutional 
framers); State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982) (seminal analysis of state 
constitutional free expression guarantee without mention of framers’ intentions as the basis 
for the analysis).  Stranahan did not address the existence of such cases.  Nor did it 
provide an explanation why the court apparently feels bound by the intentions of the 
framers in some cases, but not in others. 
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circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision 
are relevant and informative.  But, as Oregon Supreme Court Justice 
Hans Linde once observed, although it may not be possible to argue 
intelligently about specific clauses of the constitution without 
knowing their histories, “it does not follow that larger principles are 
confined to what the generation that adopted them was ready to live 
by.”174 
But one does not have to reject a jurisprudence of original intent 
simpliciter to conclude that it should have no place in the construction 
of the search and seizure provisions of article I, section 9.  An 
argument—a good argument, in my view—could be made that the 
wording of the provision, with its reference to “reasonableness,” 
invites analysis that is not historically bound, but instead requires 
constant reassessment in the light of changing circumstances.175  In 
fact, it strikes me that, whatever the merits of originalism generally or 
as applied to other constitutional provisions, it is impossible to apply 
that interpretive approach to the law of search and seizure in any 
meaningful way.  There is too great a chasm between modern and 
nineteenth-century conceptions of law, reasonableness, criminal 
investigatory procedure, and technology.  As one scholar noted, after 
surveying the history of state and federal search and seizure 
guarantees, 
the authentic history of search and seizure reveals that a large gulf 
separates framing-era doctrinal conceptions and criminal justice 
institutions from our current conceptions and institutions.  The story 
is not one of simple changes in particular rules or standards; rather 
it is a story of a fundamental transformation amounting to a 
paradigm shift.  Modern investigatory procedure confers powers on 
police officers that contravene and violate not only the specific 
rules of framing-era common law, but also the basic principles and 
values that led the Framers to endorse accusatory procedure. 
 
174 Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 
165, 184 (1984). 
175 See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 55, at 824 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment, more than many 
other parts of the Constitution, appears to require a fairly high level of abstraction of 
purpose; its use of the term ‘reasonable’ (actually, ‘unreasonable’) positively invites 
constructions that change with changing circumstances.”); Sklansky, supra note 55, at 
1791 (“[E]ven most dyed-in-the-wool originalists concede that certain constitutional 
provisions seem to cry out for open-ended interpretation . . . . And few parts of the 
Constitution seem to call more loudly for this kind of interpretation than the opening 
clause of the Fourth Amendment.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 399 (1974) (“What we do know, because the language 
of the fourth amendment says so, is that the framers were disposed to generalize to some 
extent beyond the evils of the immediate past.”). 
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 The bottom line is that there is no way that we can now “return” 
to the original understanding of the constitutional limits on 
government arrest and search power—and it is quite doubtful that it 
would be desirable to do so, even if we could.  Too much has 
changed.176 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s lockstep adherence to the federal 
warrant-preference rule is equally puzzling.  Nothing in the wording 
of article I, section 9 suggests anything close to a requirement that, in 
the words of Davis, “warrantless entries and searches of premises are 
per se unreasonable unless falling within one of the few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.”177  As I have noted, the rule is taken verbatim from the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decision in Katz.  Beyond 
that citation to federal case law, the Oregon courts have never 
explained the basis for the conclusion that article I, section 9 requires 
warrants. 
That is an odd thing, I submit, for a state that touts itself as the 
vanguard of the state constitutional revolution.  It is an especially odd 
thing in light of cases from earlier in the twentieth century that 
rejected outright the notion that the Oregon Constitution presumes the 
necessity of warrants to justify a search or seizure as reasonable.  In 
cases such as De Ford and Lee, the Oregon Supreme Court expressly 
held that article I, section 9 does not require warrants and, instead, 
requires only that searches and seizures be reasonable in light of the 
circumstances of each case.  The court has never overruled either case 
as to that issue and has never explained the shift in its reading of the 
constitution. 
That is not to say that the court could not provide such an 
explanation.  The court could adopt the position that the framers of 
the Oregon Constitution understood and intended such a warrant-
preference rule.  I think that the court would have a difficult time 
making a historical case for that.  As I have noted, the wording of 
article I, section 9 certainly does seem to suggest that—whatever the 
framers of the Fourth Amendment may have understood seventy 
years earlier—the framers of the Oregon Constitution intended that 
the reasonableness clause have enforceable effect.  But it is another 
thing entirely to suggest that the evidence demonstrates that the clause 
was intended to impart a preference for warrants. 
 
176 Davies, supra note 23, at 222. 
177 State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 237, 666 P.2d 802, 809 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Or I suppose that the court could do what it has done in other 
contexts, that is, take the position that, because of the passage of time 
since the adoption of the warrant-preference rule, it is incumbent on 
opponents of such a rule to demonstrate affirmatively that the framers 
did not intend it.178  Given that article I, section 9 was adopted 
without discussion or amendment, it would be difficult indeed to meet 
that burden.  But taking the position that an error that is repeated often 
enough can thereby become correct seems a poor basis for so 
foundational a principle of constitutional law.  It also seems contrary 
to the practice of the court in the years following the state 
constitutional revolution, particularly in search and seizure cases—
cases in which the court has said that “[t]his court is not required 
blindly to follow earlier ‘rules’ of constitutional law.  Our 
responsibility for constitutional interpretation is an ongoing one 
which we will not sidestep by relying on” prior cases that were 
decided with little or no analysis.179 
Yet another option is that the court could take a more functional 
approach and explain that, given its evaluation of the policies 
underlying the state search and seizure guarantee, it makes sense to 
require—subject to limited exceptions—police to comply with a 
warrant process.  I think that a good case can be made for reaching 
such a conclusion, although there certainly are arguments to the 
contrary.180  Resolving that particular debate is beyond the scope of 
 
178 The court’s decision in State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or. 282, 121 P.3d 613 (2005), 
provides an example.  In that case, the state suggested that current doctrine under the free 
expression guarantee of article I, section 8 could not be squared with evidence of 
nineteenth-century views about the authority of states to regulate speech and expressive 
conduct.  The court held that, to overturn existing doctrine—which dates back to a 1982 
decision, State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982)—the state was required to 
prove not merely what the framers most likely intended article I, section 8 to mean, but 
that the framers affirmatively did not intend the provision to develop as it did.  “A decent 
respect for the principle of stare decisis,” the court said, required no less.  Ciancanelli, 339 
Or. at 290, 121 P.3d at 617.  Given that there is almost no direct evidence about the 
intentions of the framers of the Oregon Constitution in adopting article I, section 8 it will 
come as no surprise that the court concluded that the state had failed in its burden. 
179 State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or. 195, 203, 766 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1988). 
180 The principal arguments in favor of a warrant requirement, briefly stated, are that it 
provides an objective, ex ante determination by a neutral magistrate who is in the best 
position to weigh the needs of the police against the rights of the individual under the 
particular circumstances of each case.  The requirement, it is argued, avoids the problems 
associated with police officers making such reasonableness determinations on an ad hoc 
basis, including the problem of leaving law enforcement officers without clear guidance as 
to the scope of their authority, and the problem that an absence of such clear guidance 
creates a danger of arbitrary enforcement of the law.  As one scholar noted, inviting law 
enforcement officers to make ad hoc judgments about the reasonableness of their own 
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this Article, however.  My point is that the Oregon courts have never 
engaged in such an analysis of the state constitutional search and 
seizure guarantee. 
Admittedly, it could be argued that my concerns about the failure 
of the courts to address the warrant preference rule as a matter of state 
constitutional law are purely academic, because, whether or not 
article I, section 9 imposes a warrant requirement, the fact remains 
that the Fourth Amendment does.  I submit that there is less to that 
argument than might meet the eye, however.  First, if the state 
constitution happens to provide less protection of individual rights 
than the federal constitutional counterpart, the Federal Constitution 
will control.181  But, either way, the state constitution means what it 
means.182  In point of fact, it is not that unusual for the courts to find 
 
conduct “converts the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot.”  Amsterdam, 
supra note 175, at 393.  The requirement further avoids the potential biases and distortions 
(including potential incentives to commit perjury to justify otherwise unlawful searches 
and seizures) that result in evaluating determinations of reasonableness after the fact.  See 
generally William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 
881, 911–13 (1991).  The articles concerning Fourth Amendment theory and the 
justifications for a warrant requirement are too numerous to cite completely.  For a sample 
of scholars arguing in support of a warrant preference rule, see generally Steiker, supra 
note 55; Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197 (1993); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).  There are, as I have noted, criticisms of the warrant-
preference rule and arguments often offered in its favor.  For a useful critique of the usual 
arguments in favor of warrants (by a scholar who nevertheless supports warrants for other 
reasons), see generally Stuntz, supra, at 890–97.  One particularly frequent criticism is that 
the assumption that neutral magistrates actually evaluate the grounds for the issuance of 
warrants cannot be supported on empirical grounds.  See, e.g., George R. Nock, The Point 
of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth of Magisterial Discretion, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1990) (“Every observation of the realities of the warrant-issuing process suggest sthe 
unsoundness of the belief that magistrates typically exercise the reasoning and 
discretionary functions” so often cited by supporters of a warrant-preference rule.); Wayne 
R. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the 
“Quagmire,” 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 27 (1972) (“What empirical studies are available 
suggest that the [Supreme] Court’s oft-stated preference for warrants is based more upon 
myth than fact.  Arrest warrants are commonly issued in the absence of any meaningful 
participation by a judicial officer . . . .”). 
181 See generally Williams, supra note 129 (reviewing basics of state judicial federalism 
in the context of search and seizure decisions). 
182 As Hans Linde explained in E Pluribus, supra note 174, at 179: 
 The right question is not whether a state’s guarantee is the same as or broader 
than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the [U.S.] Supreme Court.  The right 
question is what the state’s guarantee means and how it applies to the case at 
hand.  The answer may turn out the same as it would under federal law.  The 
state’s law may prove to be more protective than federal law.  The state law also 
may be less protective.  In that case the court must go on to decide the claim 
under federal law, assuming it has been raised. 
 2008] The Search for the Meaning of Oregon’s Search and Seizure Clause 865 
that the state constitution does not afford the same rights as the 
Federal Constitution.183  Second, whatever may be the rhetoric of 
Federal Fourth Amendment cases, the reality is that the so-called 
warrant-preference rule is so riddled with exceptions that, as some 
scholars have complained, it can hardly be asserted seriously that 
there is a presumption that warrants are required.184  Third, and aside 
from that, there is always the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court 
will change its mind.  As I stated at the outset, federal constitutional 
doctrine is not static.  The Supreme Court, in fact, has shown little 
hesitation to overturn decades of settled doctrine in the name of more 
closely adhering to the intentions of the framers of the Federal 
Constitution.  Recent decisions with respect to the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause and right to a jury trial come to mind.185  The 
 
See also Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1123, 1125–30 (1992) (“[N]othing in federal constitutional law prevents state courts 
from interpreting state law more narrowly than federal, despite the fact that they are barred 
from enforcing the less-protective state law.”). 
183 See, e.g., State v. Ice, 343 Or. 248, 170 P.3d 1049 (2007), cert. granted, ___ U.S. 
___, 128 S. Ct. 1657 (2008) (article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution does not 
require jury findings as predicate for imposition of consecutive sentences, although Sixth 
Amendment does); State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d 894 (1986) (article I, section 12 
of the Oregon Constitution does not require police to give Miranda warnings that the 
Federal Constitution does). 
184 This has been a regular complaint from scholars for years.  See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, 
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
199, 236 (1993) (“The warrant rule no longer is the central conceptual tool for determining 
whether government conduct is reasonable for fourth amendment purposes.  The rule now 
is the exception . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement—The 
Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 691, 744 (1982) (“[T]he Court’s preference 
is in words, not in deeds.”).  The current state of Fourth Amendment doctrine has become 
an object of outright ridicule among legal scholars.  Amar has remarked that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment today is an embarrassment.”  Amar, supra note 41, at 757.  Steinberg has 
commented that current doctrine is “arbitrary, unpredictable, and often border[ing] on 
incoherent.”  David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original 
Understanding Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 47 (2005).  Another scholar 
complains that the Supreme Court’s case law is “a mass of contradictions and obscurities.”  
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 
(1985).  Still another complains that each new Fourth Amendment case is like “more duct 
tape on the Amendment’s frame and a step closer to the junkyard.”  Erik G. Luna, 
Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 787–88 (1999). 
185 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Sixth Amendment 
guarantees right to a jury trial on factual predicates to imposition of departure sentences 
from presumptive sentences under state sentencing guidelines); Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Sixth Amendment guarantees that out-of-court statement may not be 
admitted without right of confrontation if the statement is “testimonial” in nature); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment guarantees right to a 
jury trial as to any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum). 
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cases wholly revolutionized federal doctrine and left lower courts 
scrambling to deal with the consequences.186  Nothing prevents the 
Court from bringing the same sort of revolutionary fervor to its 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  If the Court, for example, were to adopt 
the view that, based on a reexamination of the historical record, the 
framers never intended the Fourth Amendment to apply to warrantless 
police conduct, what would be the state of Oregon search and seizure 
doctrine, which has cited only federal case law in support of its 
current warrant-preference rule? 
One way or the other, then, it seems to me manifestly important 
that the Oregon courts not simply continue to rely on Federal Fourth 
Amendment case law for a warrant-preference rule.  Instead, the 
courts should treat article I, section 9 as the separate and independent 
constitutional provision that it is.  They should decide whether 
warrants are presumptively required for a search or seizure to be 




186 The articles on Apprendi, Blakely, and Crawford and their impact on state and 
federal courts are legion.  For a sample of the commentary, see generally Joanna Shepherd, 
Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 533 (2007); John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing 
Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235 
(2006); Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After Crawford: The Decision’s Impact on How 
Hearsay Is Analyzed Under the Confrontation Clause, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 327 
(2006); Douglas A. Berman & Steven L. Chanenson, The Real (Sentencing) World: State 
Sentencing in the Post-Blakely Era, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, 
Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the 
Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005); Robert M. Pitler, 
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its 
Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
